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This study is about the place of traditional authorities in local level rural governance 
in post-colonial Zimbabwe. It came about as a result of some conflicting and 
overlapping laws that govern the lives of the rural residents, ultimately creating 
conflicts between traditional authorities and their elected counterparts. In addition, the 
study seeks to examine why the ZANU PF led government recognised traditional 
authorities after almost a decade of their neglect. The study further examines whether 
the recognition of hereditary traditional authorities is consistent with the principles of 
liberal democracy and attempts to evaluate the impact of the co-existence model 
within the local government arena where democratically elected structures are 
integrated under a hereditary system of traditional leadership. 
The study is based on documentary research on the subject matter as well as on field 
work in the Zimnyama community in Bulilimamangwe district of Matebeleland South 
Province in Zimbabwe. It argues that generalisations about the role of traditional 
authorities in rural local governance may be misleading since not everyone in the rural 
areas supports the system of traditional leadership. In the same vein, the study reveals 
that most land administration laws in Zimbabwe seem to inhibit traditional authorities 
in favour of elected structures thus causing tension and conflict between the two 
structures. This tends to underplay the role played by traditional authorities in 
contemporary rural governance as they are labelled backward and undemocratic. 
Drawing from the case study of Zimnyama ward, the study argues that effective rural 
development can be achieved if the positive features of both the traditional system of 
governance and that of the elected structures are combined. To this end, the study 











contemporary local governance because in the eyes of the rural communities, they 
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1.1 Introduction and problem statement 
The upsurge in popular protest in most African countries in the 1990s has focused 
scholarly interest in transparency and accountability in the management of public 
affairs (FisiyI995:49). Rural local governance in the colonial period has always been 
monopolised by traditional leaders. Come independence in 1980, the focus is on 
representation through democratically elected structures. Thus, the challenge facing 
most post-colonial states is how to deal with the hereditary institution of traditional 
leadership in a democracy. This study examines the above phenomenon using the 
experience of Zimnyama area in Bulilimamangwe District of Zimbabwe. 
Following independence in 1980, the new government 10 Zimbabwe distinctively 
reduced the powers of traditional leaders. Although they were not abolished, 
traditional leaders were marginalised whilst the elected structures were recognised as 
the sole legal representative body in rural governance. This was achieved through the 
promulgation of contradictory and unclear policy initiatives. Prior to this, traditional 
leaders were in charge of tribal Icommunal land allocation the new government took 
this responsibility to elected structures. However, by the late 1990s, the state 
recognised the institution of traditional leadership and decided to mix the traditional 
leadership structures with political structures under the local government authority. 
Spierenburg (2002) illuminates this point as she argues that the laws governing rural 










and contradictory. At one time they were in support of the elected structure and at 
times in support of the traditional leaders. 
At face value the state appeared to deal with traditional leaders in a contradictory 
manner since recognising traditional leaders on one hand whilst on the other hand 
upholding the principle of representative democracy is a contradiction of terms. 
Flowing from the above confusing background, a number of critical questions that 
form the basis of the study arise below. What is the role of traditional leadership in 
post-colonial Zimbabwe? How and why did a government that had initially neglected 
traditional authorities in the early years of independence Zimbabwe end up 
recognising such an institution? What are the implications for such a change of heart 
in a liberal democracy? Can the two leadership structures co-exist in contemporary 
rural local governance? 
The critical dilemma facing Zimbabwe today is whether to gIve more powers to 
traditional authorities in a new socio-political environment which seeks to promote 
"transparency" and "participation" by all (Mushauri 1999). Of particular interest is to 
understand whether the Mugabe government in its attempt to create some political 
space for the traditional and elected leadership structures has not compromised 
democracy. For an in depth unpacking of the inquiry, a case study approach is 
adopted using Zimnyama ward in Bulilimamangwe district of Zimbabwe. The 
objective is to understand the role of traditional leadership structures in the 











In the next section, I will consider some conceptual and theoretical debates around the 
issue of the role of the institution of traditional leadership in a democracy. 
1.3 Theoretical and Conceptual Framework 
A review of the 1990s literature on the role of traditional leaders in post colonial 
Africa reveals that there are baiiically three schools of thought in this debate. The first 
school of thought contends that because of its hereditary nature the institution of 
traditional leadership is not compatible with democracy. I refer to this as the Equal 
Rights School. The second school argues that the traditional and the elected leadership 
can co-exist. Following Ntsebeza, I !e!~~t~ !l:Iis as the Co-existence School. The third 
school of thought argues that traditional leaders are legitimate in their own right and 
* 
as such they do not need any elections because they were born to rule. I refer to it as 
the Automatic Leader ~_c:1100l. In many ways, this is a classification that has been 
followed by Lungisile Ntsebeza in his study of rural governance in South Africa. 
1.4 The equal rights school 
Mamdani (1996) a proponent of the equal rights school of thought dismisses the 
institution of traditional leadership as undemocratic because of its hereditary nature 
and its bureaucratic commandeering attitude imposed upon it by colonial oppressors. 
According to Mamdani, the African was "containerised" not as a native or indigenous 
African but as a "tribesperson". Colonialists adopted the divide and rule strategy 
basing on the fact that "tradition" and "custom" were the indigenous forms of social 
organization. He further argues that it is in this urban-rural separation that colonialists 











urban-rural division rules and regulations. The colonialists used force to a great extent 
and it is this strategy that Mamdani describes as decentralised despotism. In the eyes 
of Mamdani the chief was a critical player in the administration of local affairs. 
He was the Native Authority with a high concentration of powers which resembled a 
"clenched fist". To Mamdani; 
The functionary of the local state apparatus was everywhere called the 
chief .. not only did the chief have the right to pass rules governing persons 
under his domain. He also executed all laws and was the administrator of in 
"his" area, in which he settled all disputes. The authority of the chief thus 
fused in a single person all moments of power: judicial, legislative and 
administrative. This authority was like a clenched jist, necessary because the 
chief stood at the intersection of the market economy and the non- market one 
(Mamdani 1996:23). 
The office bearers of the Native Authority were not answerable to their subjects but to 
their superiors (the colonial masters) who appointed them. In the circumstance, by 
virtue of such a relationship, traditional authorities became mere tools of the colonial 
powers. It is on the basis of this top down approach to rural governance and lack of 
representative democracy within traditional authorities that Mamdani dismisses the 
institution of traditional leaders as undemocratic. 
Mamdani further argues that the colonial legacy was reproduced in post colonial 
Africa of course not in its totality but with some form of modification. In a bid to 
reform the colonial state, he advances that most post independence governments 
generally embraced some remnants of the colonial governments. This in itself is 
despotism in the post independence political landscape. In his view, post-colonial 
African states whether conservative or radical, only deracialised the colonial state but 











The bifurcated state that was created with colonialism was deracialised, but it was 
not democratised ... the limits of the conservative states were obvious: they removed 
the sting of racism from a colonially fashioned stronghold but kept in place the Native 
Authorities, which enforced the division between ethnicities. The radical states went a 
step further, joining the deracialization to detribalization. But the deracialised and 
detribalised power they organised put a premium on administrative decision making 
as they tightened central control over local authorities whilst inflaming a division 
between town and country. In the process, both experiences reproduced one part of 
the dual legacy of the bifurcated state and created their own distinctive version of 
despotism (Mamdani 1996:26-27). 
It is against this background therefore that Mamdani dismisses the "bifurcated state" 
and calls for its dismantling. He believes that once this happens, this will mean "an 
endeavour to link the urban and rural - and thereby a series of related binary opposites 
such as rights and custom, representation and participation, centralisation and 
decentralisation, civil society and community in ways that have yet to be done" 
(1996:34). It is against the above backdrop, that Mamdani views the institution of 
traditional leadership as being incompatible with the principles of democracy since it 
has always failed .to be accountable to its subjects due to decades of colonial 
influence. To him traditional leadership institution has no place in contemporary post-
colonial Africa. It is important to note that my above delineation has been largely 
influenced by Ntsebeza' s understanding of Mamdani. 
In his contribution Ntsebeza (2004) argues that traditional authorities are incompatible 
with democracy since they fail to pass the test of representative democracy which 
gives the citizens the opportunity to choose a leader to represent their interests. He 
unveils two principles of democratic decentralisation that are worth noting: downward 
accountability of public officials and of elected representatives. He observes however 
that the institution of traditional leadership can potentially be democratic in one 
important respect: involvement of rural residents in decision making process through 











hereditary rule, the possibility of rural residents having the freedom to choose which 
institution and/or individuals should rule them is automatically excluded (Ntsebeza 
2004:85). 
Ntsebeza in particular argues that establishing democratic and accountable structures 
whilst at the same time recognising an undemocratic and unaccountable institution of 
traditional leadership is a fundamental contradiction. According to Ntsebeza, 
upholding a constitution that enshrines democratic principles in a Bill of rights, whilst 
acknowledging a political role, for unelected and hereditary traditional authorities, is 
inconsistent and contradictory"(Ntsebeza 2004:72). In this light, he argues that 
ensuring that all rural communities enjoy the right to choose their representatives 
should be the desirable approach by post -colonial states rather than mixing 
democratically elected structures with a hereditary system of leadership. His version 
of democracy is that it should be both participatory and representative rather than one 
or the other. 
The gist of Ntsebeza's argument is that traditional authorities can at best playa 
ceremonial role rather than a political one in contemporary post colonial Africa where 
democratisation of rural local governance has become a strong force. 
Sithole (2000) is another proponent of the Equal Rights school of thought. Following 
the classical Marxist tradition, Sithole argues that traditional authorities in the context 
of a modern state are a dying species because they have no leadership role to play for 
their people. Just like Mamdani, he argues "the colonial state demoted chiefs from 











interests of the colonial master and this undermined their credibility and efficacy in 
the eyes of their people."(Sithole 2000:62) He contends that the current crop of 
traditional authorities is a product of colonialism both in orientation and inclination 
because the institution is upwardly accountable to the state and not downwards to the 
people. It is this characteristic that makes traditional authorities undemocratic (Sithole 
2000:63). To support his view on the irrelevance of traditional authorities in 
contemporary Africa, Sithole states: 
I know there is a sentiment to restore the power of traditional leaders in the 
search for effective and democratic governance in Africa today. However, 
what traditional leadership and power do we want to restore: that which 
obtained during the pre-colonial period or that which obtained during the 
colonial period? My argument is that pre-colonial institutions have become 
obsolete and impossible to retrieve because we can not reinvent the pre-
colonial traditional leaders nor subject (Sithole: 65). 
What Sithole is suggesting is that colonialism acted as a catalyst to speed up the 
demise of traditional African societies. According to him, what we call traditional 
leadership today has been bastardised by the colonial stat€. It is against this 
background that he dismisses the institution of traditional leaders as a dying species. 
Sithole concurs with Mamdani that there is nothing purely traditional about chiefs 
anymore because of the machinations of colonialism which reduced them to mere 
bureaucrats of the state. 
It is worth noting though that Spierenburg (2002) expresses a different point of view 
on the influence of tradition in the re-insurgence of traditional authorities. She 
believes that much as one might appreciate the damage caused by colonialism on the 
African traditional practises, some remnants of traditional values are still prevalent. 











opposition to new government policies that were imposed from above. (Spierenburg 
2002: 19). The above author suggests that the institution of traditional leadership either 
invents or re-invents traditions to acclaim eroded legitimacy in the eyes of the people 
(see also Migdal 1998). 
However, in the eyes of Ntsebeza the issue of inventing or re-inventing tradition by 
traditional authorities does not make the institution of traditional leadership 
democratic in the liberal sense because the structure still retains its hereditary nature. 
1.5 The co-existence school 
Patrons for this school of thought uphold the view that it is possible for the traditional 
authorities to co-exist with their politically elected counterparts. One of the 
proponents of this version is Hlatshwayo (1998) who uses the term "harmonisation" 
to describe the nature of the co-existence between the traditional and elected leaders. 
Hlatshwayo sees merit in both structures hence his belief that the two can co-exist in 
rural local governance. 
His argument is: 
Harmonization aims at involving the entire role players in institutions which deal 
with areas of common interest, so that the decisions made by the harmonized 
institutions would be binding for all concerned, i.e. binding both in law and 
conscience. Thus traditional authorities would be represented in the Rural District 
council and would argue the traditional point of view in council, but would be bound 
by the decisions reached. (Hlatshwayo 1998: 136 J. 











have distinctive and special roles, which require their separate existence, they have to 
leverage their positions and jointly come up with decisions that bind both parties at a 
local government level. To this end, Hlatshwayo envisages a situation whereby 
traditional authorities are given a quota of representation in council and work side by 
side with elected councillors. In this way then, there is a possibility for co-existence 
between the two leadership institutions. Perhaps we might have a new hybrid product 
which taps the positives from both worlds. 
Whilst one appreciates this argument, the author does not specify in explicit terms 
how the two leadership structures can be harmonized. Furthermore, he does not 
explain what the co-existence shall be based on nor does he reveal the mechanisms to 
be put in place to ensure that each party will be bound by the collective decisions 
reached. It is highly unlikely that two different leadership structures one based on 
hereditary principles and the other based on electoral representation, can be easily 
harmonised without any conflicts between the two. This is likened to placing "two 
bulls in one kraal" and expect harmony. 
Another proponent Senyonjo (2004: 4) argues that 
While traditional institutions as represented by the traditional leadership are 
ancient, they are a repository of history and collective experience of the 
people. The history and the experience are foundations on which solid modern 
institutions are built. 
Senyonjo contends that not withstanding the machinations of colonialism, traditional 
authorities survived the storm. He believes traditional leaders still command some 











argues that the support some rural communities afford their traditional leaders is an 
indicator that they believe in it. It is true that the colonial powers attempted to pervert 
and destroy the best elements of African rule but they did not succeed in destroying 
the steady spirit of the essential Africanism of the people (See also Holomisa 2004:2). 
Ngubane (2004) also subscribes to the co-existence school of thought. Likewise, he 
sees a role for the traditional leadership in contemporary post colonial African states. 
He believes in the quest for the formula that would reflect the contemporary African 
state where both the elected structures and traditional structures have a recognised 
role to play in leadership. Ngubane does not agree with the notion that recognising the 
existence of a hereditary institution whilst at the same time upholding the principles of 
democracy is a contradiction. He believes that the harmonisation process ultimately 
produces a product that learns from the past and the present to create a better future. 
There is no need to dismantle the traditional leadership since it is equally important in 
the contemporary post colonial Africa. He observes that: 
We believe in the quest for the formula of a truly modern and truly African 
state This is the formula in which Westernised and traditional realities are 
harmonised together in a framework of mutual respect which offers to both 
equal opportunities for economic growth and social development in 
accordance with specific characteristics (Ngubane2004:88). 
What is worth noting about Ngubane's argument is that he does not elaborate how the 
harmonisation between the traditional and elected leaders can be achieved. Although 
harmonisation is feasible, it is the formula in which westernised and traditional 












As much as Ahluwalia (2001), another advocate of the co-existence model appreciates 
Mamdani's argument that post colonial Africa inherited the bifurcated state which has 
subjects and citizens situated in the rural and the urban areas, he believes such a 
scenario has changed over time. He argues that Mamdani recognises the centrality of 
subjects in the decolonisation process but is not willing to acknowledge the freedom 
they gain at independence, when the entire polity is granted citizenship. His view is 
that Mamdani operates from a position where people are ascribed fixed identities yet 
in reality the post colonial subjects have multiple identities that are shaped continually 
by the practise of everyday life and also have the capacity to resist, to speak and to act 
as citizen and subjects. 
Such a view might illustrate the complexities of post colonial identity especially in the 
face of intense globalisation. In the light of the above, he highlights that it does not 
follow that if one is resident in the rural areas he or she is exclusively a subject who 
does not enjoy the benefits of freedom and independence given to all the citizens of a 
country. For example, there are some people in the rural areas who do not believe in 
traditional authorities because they view themselves exclusively as citizens of a 
country. Others, as Ahluwalia seems to suggest, choose to be subjects by believing in 
the traditional leadership and shift to citizens as and when the situation dictates a 
scenario that Ntsebeza views as contradictory to liberal democratic principles. To 
emphasise this point Ray and Reddy (2003:5) also argue that some people of the post-
colonial state realise that the roots of political legitimacy are divided between the 
post-colonial state and the traditional(ie,pre-colonially rooted) leadership hence their 












Nyamnjoh (2003) is another scholar who re-iterates his support for the co-existence 
theory. He argues that a growing number of scholars recognise chieftaincy as a force 
to reckon with in contemporary African politics, especially with increasing claims for 
recognition, restitution and representation by cultural and ethnic communities, with 
the advent of globalisation as a process of flows and closures. A colonial creation or 
not, chieftaincy as a political and cultural identity marker is there to be studied not 
dismissed (Nyamnjoh 2003: 14). 
His argument is premised on the fact that the institution of traditional leadership has 
displayed remarkable dynamism and adaptability to new socio-economic and political 
developments without being erased by the latter. It is this resilience inherent in 
traditional authorities that earns them recognition by the post-colonial African states. 
To re-iterate his point, Nyamnjoh (2003) believes the adaptability and the continuous 
appeal of chieftaincy makes of democracy in Africa an unending project, an 
inspiration that is subject to renegotiation with changing circumstances and growing 
claims by individuals and communities for recognition and representation.(see also 
Vilakazi 1997). 
What is apparent about Nyamnjoh is that he supports the co-existence school of 
thought through some kind of rhetoric on the call for recognising traditional 
authorities in contemporary Africa without substantiating how the co-existence can be 
achieved. He also does not seem to clarify the issue of how traditional authorities can 
pass the test of representative democracy in this changing socio-economic and 
political environment. However, one lesson drawn from recognising traditional 











from a western purview when dealing with the institution of traditional leadership in 
post colonial Africa. 
Further, Nyamnjoh's suggestion does not seem to address what form this unending 
project of democracy is going to take. In addition, he does not proffer any concrete 
alternative to liberal democracy that guides contemporary governance. The 
conception of democracy in post-colonial Africa as propounded by Ntsebeza (2006) is 
very clear. His position is that both participatory and representative elements of 
democracy are vital in the post-colonial democratic transition. In this regard, the way 
in which traditional authorities could playa public political role would be for them to 
abandon their hereditary status and subject themselves to the process of election by 
people. They can bring to the project of post-colonial democracy the participatory 
element in decision making that the traditional systems are renowned of. Yet on the 
other hand subjecting traditional authorities to the process of election is contradictory 
to their hereditary method of gaining power. This then becomes a dilemma or 
challenge for post -colonial states as traditional authorities find themselves at 
crossroads in this project of liberal democracy in contemporary rural governance. 
In my opinion the key argument postulated by the co-existence school of thought is 
that those post-colonial states who decide not to banish traditional authorities should 
compromise and accommodate them in rural governance as ceremonial figures who 











1.6 The natural leader school 
The champion for this model is Fisiy (1995) who believes that traditional authorities 
are leaders of their communities in their own right. In the eyes of Fisiy, traditional 
leaders are entitled to natural leadership of their people by virtue of the experience 
acquired during pre-colonial times which has been passed from one generation to the 
other. According to Fisiy the experience mentioned above despite the impact of 
colonialism on this institution, is still significant and fundamental for modern day 
governance. To concretise his point he argues that "for all the various transformations 
of such institutions during the colonial and post -colonial periods, the present 
incumbents claim that they are the true representatives of their "people" 
(Fisiy1995:49). 
It is in the history of pre-colonial administration that the author emphasises on as the 
only guarantee and justification for traditional leaders to claim a stake in modern local 
governance. Flowing from the above, it appears as if Fisiy views the role of traditional 
leaders in contemporary rural local governance as a gi ven case that does not warrant 
any questioning. It is against such a background that I labelled his thesis the natural 
leader school of thought. 
Another proponent of this school is Holomisa (2003). He argues that people should 
not be sceptical about the ability of traditional authorities to govern their own affairs 
because it is on record that the traditional leaders achieved this prior to the arrival of 
the colonialists. Holomisa believes that traditional authorities are natural community 











democracy? It is important to note that times are changing as we all live in a global 
village now. Proponents for the natural leader school can not solely harp on the past, 
because effective rural governance also depends on the present and the future. In my 
view, it is difficult for traditional authorities can re-invent tradition because 
contemporary society has been engulfed by globalisation which radically disrupted 
African traditions and culture. It is against this background that one might question 
the validity of the natural leader school of thought. Its proponents as demonstrated 
above do not have substantial evidence to substantiate their claim that traditional 
authorities ought to playa role in a democracy. 
Keulder (1998) argues that the natural leader school represents the traditionalists that 
often romanticise and glorify the invention and re-invention of the past. Hence they 
are inclined to ignore the autocratic and repressive inclination of some traditional 
authorities. This line of argument does not take into consideration the dynamics 
inherent in any institution. In the eyes of Keulder, the challenge for this school is 
that it seems to be fixed and stuck to pre-colonial history and does not seem to 
acknowledge the changes or transformations that have been exerted on traditional 











1. 7 Research design and methodology 
1.7.1 Methods used 
The data used for this study was gathered though the use of use of primary and 
secondary sources. 
1. 7.2 Primary sources 
For the historical aspects of the study, archival records especially letters or 
correspondence from the District Commissioner in Plumtree (now Bulilimamangwe) 
was used. Such material was of great help to me especially in illuminating and 
strengthening my understanding of the relationship between the colonial authorities 
and the institution of the traditional leadership. 
The other primary source was interviews. I held some informal and unstructured 
interviews at the Bulilima and Mangwe RDC stakeholders' workshop on development 
structures on the 15th of August 2005 in Plumtree town. 
In order to extract some information on the role of traditional leadership in land 
administration affairs in post independent Zimbabwe, I conducted some semi 
structured interviews using open-ended questions with 12 respondents in Zimnyama 
ward between August and September 2005. The rationale behind the use of semi 
structured questions was to enable myself to focus and also facilitate an orderly 












The research targeted a wide range of respondents across gender and generation 
divides (see annex 2 on profile of respondents). Interviews were conducted in 
Zimnyama ward through the use of open-ended questions on perceptions of the role of 
traditional leadership in land administration and how conflicts on land allocation 
between the two structures can be averted. A total of 14 respondents were interviewed 
in the following categories: 
• 6 Adults aged 18years and above (both men and women) within the ward. 
• 1 Government and 1 Rural District Council official. 
• 1 Chief, 1 Headmen and 1 Village Head. 
• 1 Councillor, 1. Former VIDCO Chairperson and 1 Ward development Co-
ordinator. 
Twelve respondents were drawn from the Zimnyama ward since they reside within 
the study area while the remainder represented the voices of the District Head of the 
Ministry of Youth and Employment Creation and the acting Chief Executive Officer 
of Bulilimamangwe Rural District Council. Both officials have regular contacts with 
both the traditional and elected leaders in the day to day discharge of their duties. 
Another key method used in the collection of information relating to communal land 
administration was participant observation. During my field trips in the Zimyama 
ward, I attended a ward assembly meeting held on the lih of April 2006 at the ward 
centre (community hall) where all the six villages of the ward were represented by 











planning session for Mapulule village on the 20th of April 2006. Both forums gave 
me some remarkable exposure on how the institution of traditional leadership 
interfaces with other stakeholders at grassroots level. 
1.7.3 Secondary sources 
Secondary literature included books, journal articles, reports, presentations, 
newspapers and some dissertations. These sources were found in different paces in 
Zimbabwe and in South Africa. The literature gave me some insights on colonial 
studies and regulatory frame works on traditional authorities and land administration. 
1.7.4 Selection of the Case Study Area and Rationale 
The area chosen for the case study is Zimnyama ward in Bulilimamangwe district of 
Matabeleland South Province in Zimbabwe. (See Mapl).The area was chosen for its 
historical significance particularly during the colonial period. Compared to other 
wards in Bulilimamangwe during the colonial era, Zimnyama under the Ndebele chief 
Wasi was renowned for collaborating with the colonial regime. Ndebele chiefs were 
comparatively docile to the colonial masters than their Kalanga counterparts. It is not 
surprising then that when-ever a Kalanga chief or Headmen was deposed, a Ndebele 
replacement from the south(largely from Osabeni the Ndebele dominated area) was 
promoted and pushed to the North to rule the Kalangas. Because of such allegiance to 
the colonial masters the area provides some classic example where chieftaincy and 
Ndebele culture is very much entrenched. Garbett (1966) argues that during 











or Kalanga counterparts. This provides some fertile ground for testing whether 
traditional authorities can co-exist with elected structures in contemporary times. 
1. 7.5 Limitations of the study 
Gathering information from the District Administrators office Plumtree especially 
data relating to Zimnyama ward was not an easy task. Most of the files could not be 
found. The second limitation was the current Zimbabwean crisis where prices of 
commodities escalate whilst inflation is soaring. Travelling from my home station to 
the various sites in the study area was a nightmare and almost impossible due to the 
acute shortage of fuel in the country. The erratic supply of this commodity negatively 
impacted on my schedule of meetings and the coverage of the ward. It was also not 
easy at times to fulfil appointments with government and ROC officials since they 
were often engaged in government programmes. In certain instances, I had to 
reschedule my interviews in order to accommodate the busy schedule of the officers. 
All the above challenges tended to affect my ability to easily conduct the field work in 
Zimnyama ward. 
Finally, my low level in computer literacy especially typing contributed to the time 
taken to produce my thesis. My computer knowledge was acquired through individual 
self initiated learning at the University of Cape Town 2005. Consequently, it took me 
a longer time to finally produce my thesis as I had to grapple with some effective 
computer use techniques. 











field data with some relevant literature accessed from the University of Cape Town, 
University of the Western Cape and the British Council library in Bulawayo 
Zimbabwe. My supervisor Assoc Prof Lungisile Ntsebeza played an instrumental role 
in facilitating further access to relevant materials relating to my topic. Despite the 
above challenges, I firmly believe that the study ultimately covered the key issues as 
originally planned. 
1.7.6 Research Ethics 
In order to fulfil the university research code of ethics, I made sure that all 
interviewees were fully aware of the nature of my research and the use of my 
findings. The principle of confidentiality with regards to the collected data from the 
respondents was also upheld. Thus I ensured that all the respondents declared their 
willingness to freely participate in the research exercise before interviewing any 
prospective target of my research. All the interviewees agreed to be cited in the text 
and have their real names written on the interview scripts. 
1.8 Outline of the Thesis 
The thesis is composed of five chapters and the main issues discussed in each of the 











1.8.1 Chapter Two 
Chapter Two provides the historical background and an overVIew of rural local 
governance In colonial Zimbabwe and the first decade of independence. It 
demonstrates the governance setup during colonialism and highlights how and why 
the powers of traditional authorities were increased in the 1970s, amid some pressure 
from the liberation movements. The last segment of the chapter shows how 
traditional authorities were marginalised by the post colonial government. It 
demonstrates that new elected structures were recognised by the state in rural 
administration and highlights the impact of sidelining traditional authorities during the 
decade of the 1980s. 
1.8.2 Chapter Three 
Chapter Three is about the re-emergence of traditional leaders from the 1990s to 
present. The chapter examines why the Mugabe government recognised traditional 
leaders after a decade of neglect. The last segment of this chapter traces how co-
existence between traditional and elected structures was achieved through the analysis 
of the policy initiatives that were enacted during this era. 
1.8.3 Chapter Four 
Chapter Four focuses on the case study of Zimnyama ward. The case study provides a 
platform for the grounding of conceptual and historical issues dealt with in the first 











around traditional authorities and land administration play out in this specific ward. 
1.8.4 Chapter Five 
Chapter Five presents the main conclusions and findings of the study. It focuses on 












TRADITIONAL LEADERS AND LAND IN ZIMBABWE FROM 
1890 TO 1990 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores the role of traditional authorities in land administration from 
pre-colonial times to 1990. It begins with a historical synopsis of land administration 
and traditional leaders before independence. It shall also be argued that the 
collaboration of the traditional authorities with the colonialists disrupted the pre-
colonial customary law and practice of land administration. The next section of the 
chapter deals with the changing roles of the traditional authorities in post-
independence Zimbabwe up to 1990. 
The role of traditional authorities in land administration shall be examined against the 
background of changes in land administration legislation that took place during the 
period under review. Within the examination of the changing role of traditional 
authorities, their legitimacy is going to be interrogated. Further more, I shall highlight 
why the Zimbabwe government decided to ignore traditional leaders in favour of 
elected structures? I further argue that the new government deliberately ignored the 
traditional leaders in favour of elected structures during the decade of the 1980s in its 
quest to democratise local governance. The last segment deals with the effects of 
eroding the powers of the traditional authorities in rural governance, the reaction of 











2.2 A synopsis of pre-independence land administration in Zimbabwe 
Traditional leadership is an institution that has developed over many hundreds of 
years in Africa. It has served the African people through wars, periods of slavery 
famine, freedom struggles, political and economic restructuring during colonial and 
post-colonial periods. Rugege (2003) advances that during the pre-colonial era; the 
institution has been the basis of local government in most of Africa through out 
history. 
2.3 Political structure and role of traditional authorities 
In Zimbabwe the two mam political entities that existed before the arrival of the 
Europeans were the Ndebele and the Shona kingdoms. The thesis shall concentrate on 
the former because it is relevant to the case study area as it forms part of 
Matabeleland. The Ndebele were organised into a strongly centralised kingdom. 
Within it, the king had great power and full control of land and cattle. He was also the 
commander of a powerful and well trained army and supreme judge. As ruler he was 
assisted by two councils. One council consisted of the headmen and represented the 
interests of the "Commoners"; the other consisted of important kinsmen of the king 
and represented the interests of the "royalty' and was the supreme judge in disputes 
(Garbett 1966: 115). 
The kingdom was divided into provinces each under the control of a "great chief'. 
The provinces were in tum divided into regiments each with a regimental town as a 
political centre and a chief as a leader. Regiments were subdivided into wards and 











The headmen represented the lowest level of the judicial system. According to 
(Rugege 2003: 173) the above traditional leaders served as political, military, spiritual 
and cultural leaders and were regarded as custodians of the values of society. They 
looked after the welfare of the people by providing them with land for their 
subsistence needs through agriculture and for grazing. Schapera (1955) adds that 
traditional leaders also provided for the very poor and orphans. They resolved 
disputes and cultivated unity within their people. This system continued until the 
advent of colonialism on the Ndebele Kingdom the 1890. 
2.4 Traditional authorities and land administration 
According to Moyana (1984) prior to the advent of colonial rule African land tenure 
and administration system vested land rights on the King who was the sole Trustee. 
He allocated land to new comers and ensured that its use was in harmony with the 
traditional land tenure formula where no individual owned land and all land rights 
were inalienable. The Chief held the finite resource on behalf of the entire 
community. Under this traditional tenure system land rights were defined for groups, 
households and individuals based on customs and traditions that have evolved over 
time. Junod (1913) argues that at the level of chieftaincy, it was the head of the 
chieftaincy that assigned tracts of land to heads of lineages under his control. The 
heads of villages enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy to allocate land on their 
villages. The most fertile land ,however, was occupied by the head of the chieftaincy, 











In the light of the above, one deduces that the political organisation of traditional 
authorities and their role in land administration was not democratic. Firstly, the king 
enjoyed the concentration of all the powers. According to Junod (1913), legislative, 
executive and judicial powers were all in the hands of the king and his counsellors. 
The king was the supreme authority and his decisions were without appeal. Junod thus 
argues that such concentration of powers was reproduced at the level of chieftaincy. 
In this light, it can be argued that Mamdani' s theory of the "clenched fist" existed 
even prior to colonialism. However, it should be noted that this argument can not be 
generalised. 
Garbett (1966) argues that the Ndebele political system was welded together into a 
centralised kingdom with a great deal of power vested in the king. He contrasts this 
with the Shona speaking people who in the mid nineteenth century were organised 
politically into autonomous chiefdoms most of which were small. According to 
Holleman (1966) these chiefdoms were sub-divided, in most cases, into wards which 
were the principal land holding units. The above observations show that the political 
structure of traditional leaders during the pre-colonial era varied from one place to the 
other. It is important to note that even in pre-colonial times not all traditional leaders 
were benevolent, generous and caring towards their people. Some were autocratic and 
oppressive. (Rugege2003: 172). 
2.5 The effects of Colonial rule on traditional authorities 
Colonial rule in Zimbabwe, as in many parts of the African continent, destroyed large 











modern administration on the indigenous population. (Keulder1998:201). With the 
advent of colonialism, African societies were deprived of their land through conquest. 
This meant that the African land tenure system was tempered with whilst the 
traditional leadership system, despite its resistance, was finally subdued to the 
colonial government and reduced to an extended arm of the state. All land was 
transformed to state control and the traditional leadership structure changed its 
outlook from being a land authority into an implementing agent for the new regime. 
2.5.1 Native administration 
In order to understand the position of chiefs and land administration during the 
colonial era, it is necessary to consider the changes that took place SInce the 
establishment of European or settler administration. According to Garbett (1966) 
these changes were brought about in two ways: firstly, by the direct intervention of 
government and administration at various times in the political systems of the 
Ndebele and the Shona-speaking people. Secondly, by the involvement of Africans in 
the cash economy and their contact with the western culture. 
In order for one to illuminate the changes, this thesis in line with Weinrich's approach 
(1971) divides the history of colonial administration into four historic periods: the 
first period, stretching from the arrival of the first European settlers in 1890 up to 
1923,represents the "Period of Company Rule" when Rhodesia (currently Zimbabwe) 
was administered by the British South African Company (BSAC).The second period 
extending from 1923 to 1953,can be dubbed the "Period of Internal Self-











represents the "Federal Period" when Rhodesia formed part of the central African 
Federation of Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and 
Nyasaland (Malawi). The fourth period is the "Post-Federal Period" stretching from 
1963 to 1980 when Zimbabwe finally gained its independence. The examination of 
the four periods with regard to the position of traditional leaders and their role in land 
administration shall be achieved through some analysis of pieces of legislation 
enacted by the state in the rural governance arena. Rueschmeyer and Evans (1985:47) 
view the notion of the state as a "pact of domination". The state is therefore not a 
neutral actor or a manager of conflict. Migdal (1988) argues that major struggles in 
many states are over who has the right and ability to make rules that guide people's 
behaviour. The Zimbabwean government like the Rhodesian has sought to enunciate 
in purely technical terms, land administration policies which are designed very much 
for political purposes always in favour of the state (Drinkwater1999: 115).Thus the 
relationship between the state and traditional leaders should be viewed against the 
above backdrop through some analysis of land administration laws enunciated by the 
state. 
2.5.2 Company rule 1890-1923 
Three significant events took place during this era: first, was the creation of native 
reserves following the land commission of 1894 which delineated the boundaries for 
African areas and separated settler land from reserves as the settlers took away land 
from Africans. Secondly, then came the resistance by African communities led by 
tribal leaders in the form of the Ndebele and the Shona uprisings between 1896 and 











colonial power after the defeat of the Ndebele and the Shona. 
2.5.2.1 The establishment of reserves 
The traditional leadership was undermined by the new reserve boundaries that took no 
cognisance of existing tribal boundaries and as a result some chiefs found their 
subjects under the jurisdiction of others. This was a deliberate strategy by the colonial 
masters to destroy the authority of traditional leaders (Keulder1998: 151). By 1902 
most boundaries of African areas had been defined (Weinrich 1971: 10). 
It should be noted that the reason for the creation of native reserves was mainly to 
create a pool of cheap labour in the rural areas to be absorbed by the Europeans in 
their farms. Weinrich advances that at the turn of the nineteenth century few Africans 
were willing to work for Europeans because their own social system still provided for 
their needs. Consequently in 1896 the government introduced a tax of ten shillings, 
which was raised to one pound, in 1904, in order to induce Africans to seek 
employment (The Native Tax Ordinance 1959). Infuriated by this tax on top of a 
series of other taxes like dog tax, poll tax and cattle levies both the Ndebele and the 
Shona staged uprisings against colonial administration between 1896 and 1897. 
Following the defeat of the Ndebele and the Shona the colonial state was now 
determined to consolidate its power by transforming the African chiefs from powerful 
and respected leaders of society into European bureaucrats who were now answerable 











2.5.2.2 Bureaucratising tribal leaders 
In 1898 the Natives Department was established to manage all rural administration. 
All political powers relating to native affairs were placed in the hands of the 
administrator and his council who were responsible for the appointment of chiefs and 
the amalgamation of tribes (Keulder1998). Native commissioners assumed many of 
the functions of the functions previously performed by traditional leaders. These 
included the allocation of land and the regulation of native settlements. In 1910 the 
Native Commissioners were given full criminal and civil jurisdiction over Africans. 
This marked the beginning of direct intervention in traditional political and 
administrative system. It was also the first step taken by the colonial power to 
subordinate traditional forms of government to modern forms of government. Thus 
chiefs were now appointed as government officials and their term of office depended 
on the good behaviour and fitness. They were answerable to the administrator for the 
conduct of their communities and wee required by law to notify him of crimes, 
notification if new arrivals (strangers)in their areas, supplying men for military 
service, assisting in the apprehension of criminals and collecting taxes imposed by the 
colonial administration (Keulder 1998: 149). Both the chief and headmen below him 
received salaries in return for their services and under the headmen "book heads" now 
village heads were appointed mainly for the collection of hut tax. These individuals 
were chosen for their potential effectiveness as tax collectors in the local community 
and not according to custom (Garbett 1966: 122). 
As a result, there was a pervaSIOn of the traditional governance system to mere 











transformation had a negative impact on the position of traditional authorities. The 
Colonial state now owned all the land and land allocation procedures now differed 
from the pre-colonial era since the chief no longer had control. Sithole (2006) argues 
that the colonial state demoted the chiefs from political leaders to policemen and this 
undermined their position in the eyes of the rural people. The effective replacement of 
chiefs by native commissioners as local rulers and the consequent decrease in prestige 
and power of chiefs had its origin in the suspicion and fear which Europeans had of 
the two native uprisings in the 1890s (WeinrichI971:1l). 
2.5.2.3 The position traditional leaders 
Following the enactment of land administration policies by the state and all its 
machinations to subdue traditional leaders, the company rule era vis-a-vis traditional 
leaders can be summarised as follows: it is the period in which traditional leaders lost 
their much of their power as shown by the delineation of new traditional boundaries 
and the appointment of new chiefs and demotion of some. The old traditional leaders 
were replaced by European bureaucrats who were in charge of rural administration. 
Chiefs now became policemen of the colonial masters instead of independent leaders 
of their people. The extensive powers accorded to the native commissioners were a 
deliberate action by the state to limit the influence of traditional leaders on their 
people thus making them more dependent on the colonial masters. According to 
Garbett (1966) the chiefs were given limited duties to perform which were mainly 











2.5.3 Internal Self-Government 1923-1953 
This period is characterised by the passing of three critical pieces of legislation: the 
Land apportionment Act in 1931, the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1934 and the 
Native Land Husbandry Act of 1951all of which legalised the actual division of land 
between Africans and Europeans and under the policy of separate development. The 
Land apportionment Act marked the introduction of separate development between 
blacks and whites since high potential areas became white privately owned farms. In 
1934 the Industrial Conciliation Act was passed which protected European workers 
from African competition and indirectly introduced job reservation and racial 
segregation into the industry (Weinrich 1971: 12). 
Windrich (1975) argues that this era marked the practical application of separate 
development through social segregation between black and white in all the spheres of 
life. This led to a complete polarisation of Rhodesian society. The situation in the 
reserves was radically altered due to massive population increase and overstocking. 
Faced with the above problem the colonial state in 1951 passed the Native Land 
Husbandry Act, whose purpose was to enforce private ownership of land, de-stocking 
and conservation practices on black smallholders (native purchase areas). Weinrich 
(1975: 10) advances that in the Chagga community of Tanzania or the Kikuyu of 
Kenya individual land tenure evolved naturally from developing peasant agriculture. 
In Rhodesia the situation was different because individual land tenure among African 
peasants did not evolve naturally but was brought about by government policy. The 
purpose of creating native purchase areas was to prevent wealthier Africans, who 
wanted to but land in the open market on the same basis as Europeans, from doing so 











land ownership for Africans was introduced in Rhodesia as a means of strengthening 
the policy of separate development as indicated above. 
2.5.3.1 The reduction of powers of traditional leaders 
The enactment of the Land Husbandry Act brought a host of problems for both the 
rural communities and the traditional leaders. Peasants had to be subjected to the 
modern policies preferred by the administration and a range of measures to secure 
land use and soil conservation in the reserves. According to Keulder (1998) the 
administration relied heavily on traditional leaders to oversee the implementation of 
the measures in the rural areas. At the same time chiefs lost all power to allocate land 
and were treated by the state as mere instruments in applying policy. Peel and Ranger 
(1983) re-iterate that the Land Husbandry Act not only created much local discontent 
but also undercut the chiefs' powers overland by setting up freehold tenure in the 
reserves. Garbett (1966) advances that massive opposition in the rural areas coupled 
with, and indeed providing inspiration for the rapidly growing African nationalist 
organisation brought almost all administration to a stand still. On this issue many of 
the chiefs stood squarely with their people because the Act had removed from them 
their prerogative to allocate land to all comers ,and some chiefs objected to the 
possibility that land right might be sold to strangers without their approval. 
2.5.4 The Federal period 1953-1963 
The period under review begins with the establishment of the Federation of Rhodesia 











rapid European population increase (Weinrich (1971) argues that the government 
changed its policy of separate development to partnership between races, a 
partnership however in which Europeans were the senior partners. Whereas in the past 
they had been rejected as leaders of rebellions or as inefficient old men, during the 
Federal period chiefs were wooed by both government and African nationalists. 
2.5.4.1 Recognising the role of traditional leaders 
An interesting phenomenon characterises the federal period: the government 
improved the chiefs' position as African nationalism spread in Rhodesia. Awakening 
to the danger to European domination presented by a united African opposition, the 
government drew the chiefs into its orbit by bestowing on them privileges and 
rewards .According to Weinrich (1971) their salaries were increased and the 
government's strategy to reward and punish chiefs proved more successful in winning 
the support of chiefs than nationalists. This trend, which alienated the chiefs from the 
nationalist leaders, reached its culmination in 1962 and 1963 when the National 
Council of chiefs was formed and all nationalists' parties were banned .The chiefs 
were becoming politicians, because through their council they could represent African 
aspirations at national level. 
2.5.5 The Post-federal period 1963-1980 
The major events that characterised this era were the declaration of the Unilateral 
Declaration for Independence (UDI) in 1965 which marked the beginning of 











chiefs. This period saw the enactment of the Tribal Trust Land Act (TTLA) of 1967 
and the intensification of the guerrilla war which affected peasants, chiefs and the 
state as we shall see later. The dissolution of the Federation in 1963 led the 
government to start negotiating with Britain but because of the Rhodesian 
government's reluctance to allow Africans a larger participation in political life of the 
country, negotiations proved fruitless. When great Britain made it clear that it would 
not grant independence before the majority of Africans were legally represented in 
parliament ,the then Prime minister of Rhodesia Ian Smith declared unilateral 
independence from Britain(UDI).It is during this period that we begin to see a 
dramatic change of traditional leaders roles in land administration. 
2.5.5.1 The position of tradiionalleaders 
If during the Federal period African chiefs rose to power, during the Post-Federal 
period they were propelled into prominence (Weinrich 1971:20). In a bid to ward off 
the liberation pressure, the Smith regime began to draw the traditional leadership 
closer by giving its representatives for example, chief Ndiweni and chief Chirau the 
power to administer and allocate land in the then reserves (communal lands now). 
Despairing enforcing agricultural rules and conservation measures by direct 
administrative action, the Smith government threw at least the notional responsibility 
for them upon the chiefs (Peel and Ranger 1983:22). Such strategies gained 
prominence during the Unilateral Declaration for Independence (UDI) years of 1965-
1977 where in addition to the land authority; chiefs were represented in both the 
National Assembly and the Senate. But why would a government that has always 











Weinrich (1971) argues that the Smith government tried to trade off the support of the 
traditional leadership and their people against the nationalists cry for majority rule 
with the return of some essential functions of traditional leadership, which is the 
power to allocate and control communal land. Peel and Ranger (1983) advance that 
chiefs were drawn into the increasingly elaborate structures designed to provide a 
"tribal government" as an alternative to the nationalist political programme. 
Administrators developed an almost mystical belief that where there was nationalist 
agitation in any area this was because the tribal system was not working. 
In 1967 the government passed the Tribal Trust Lands Act (TTLA) which defined 
traditional leaders as the sole "tribal authority" whose consent every "tribesman" 
required in order to occupy and use land for agricultural and residential 
purposes"(Cheater 1990:201).1n 1969 the African Law and tribal Courts Act was 
passed ,returning the chiefs most civil and limited criminal jurisdiction What is worth 
noting is that under both acts the Minister of Internal affairs retained final control in 
tribal trust land and could invalidate or intervene in any decisions reached by the 
chief. 
According to Weinrich( 1971) since the two most essential functions of chiefs in the 
past had consisted in land allocation and trying of court cases. These functions had 
largely been removed from them when the first commissioners were appointed. Their 
return reconstituted the chiefs in their traditional roles. The truth is as much as one 
would appreciate what Weinrich advances traditional leaders in essence were in a 
precarious position since in addition to exercising their powers as land and customary 











any African views, demands or aspirations on the other (Mutizwa-Mangiza 1985:59). 
The above situation put the chiefs under a dilemma as they split allegiance to the 
colonial state and their people during the implementation of community development. 
Mutizwa-Mangiza (1985) argues that in general, the Community Development Policy 
was increasingly subordinated to the authority of the chiefs. Thus no community 
projects could be implemented without the authority of the chief in the area. 
According to Mutizwa-Mangiza (1985), most chiefs and headmen were barely 
literate, yet they were given wide responsibilities over land allocation, soil 
conservation and planning. The combination of the dictatorial powers of the district 
commissioner with the authoritarianism of the chiefs resulted in a particularly 
coercive system of control. Thus the ordinary tribal trust land villagers resisted the 
community development programme because it destroyed their way of life in which 
land was not merely a factor of production but represented their whole way of life, 
involving religion, wealth and social life. What was happening here was that the 
chieftainship was being manipulated and used as link between the Africans and the 
regime in power. 
There was talk of increasing the power of the chiefs over their people. But strictly 
speaking as (Windrich 1975: 123) puts it "if such powers were to assist the chiefs, they 
could not assist them in their traditional role as traditional custom never emanates 
from parliament, but from the African people themselves through their culture and 
beliefs". The truth is the role of chiefs had been eroded to an extent that they could no 
longer act as true traditional leaders but as extended tentacles of the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs. The above situation obtained up until 1980 when Zimbabwe attained 











shown by the support given to the nationalists against the chiefs. 
2.5.5.2 Traditional authorities during the liberation struggle 
Peasant resistance to the colonial government and its interventionist policies started in 
the 1930s long before the founding of the nationalist parties and the start of the 
guerrilla war. Ranger (1985: 160) points out that it did not need nationalist politicians 
to arouse discontent because colonial policies undermined the recognition of 
traditional customs and by using traditional leaders to enforce unpopular policies. 
Thus rural communities were already against the colonial governments and its 
traditional authorities prior to the rise of the liberation movement. In Shona pre-
colonial times the chiefs and the spirit mediums shared politico-religious authority. 
According to Keulder (1998) Mhondoro (royal ancestor) is the primary Shona spirit; 
and on earth the chief looks after all his people. When the chief dies he is transformed 
into a mhondoro and becomes the source of the land's fertility. He is the provider of 
rain and the protector of crops. Most of the literature on the Shona pre-colonial times 
is very emphatic on the role of spirit mediums in controlling the social lives of the 
people as shown by Keulder above. 
In contrast to the Ndebele pre-colonial era there is not much said about the spiritual 
role of the Ndebele chiefs except for Sibanda (2005) who talks of "Umlimu" and 
"Amatshe" as an embodiment of the history, culture and religion of the people of the 
land. Sibanda advances that "during the liberation struggle, spirit mediums spoke for 











ZAPU during the early stages of the struggle in 1953. Ranger (1996: 104) argues that 
"Umlimu" as the Ndebele called him was, the Kalanga deity; an omnipresent and 
omnipotent high God all powerful but not remote; controlling especially the seasons 
and the harvests. He further advances that within the highly centralised Ndebele state 
itself there was no place for the "Umlimu" co-ordinating agency but the Ndebele 
Kingdom used this cult from other tribes in times of trouble. Thus when the colonial 
administration embarked on a programme to strip traditional leaders of their political 
powers, it affected not only the chiefs but also the spirit mediums. As chiefs aligned 
themselves with the colonial masters they turned against their own communities, spirit 
mediums and the ancestors (Keulder 1998). 
In the early 1960s the guerrilla war broke out and the guerrilla movements of ZAPU 
and ZANU as part of the strategy to win the hearts and minds of the peasantry enlisted 
the support of the spirit mediums. Chung (2006: 198) reveals that the Smith regime 
also tried to woo spirit mediums to support their rule but the freedom fighters 
capitalised on the fact that the ancestral spirits were committed to ensuring that the 
land be returned to its rightful owners. Unlike the chiefs who openly supported the 
government the spirit mediums had always resisted the government's unpopular 
policies. 
Thus the chiefs had betrayed the ancestors by siding with the colonial government. 
Ranger (1985: 189) observes that spirit mediums were significant to peasant radical 
consciousness precisely because that consciousness was so focussed on land and on 
government interference with production: above any other force the mediums 











Spierenburg (2004) confirms this point by advancing that the importance of spirit 
mediums emanates from the role attributed to the Mhondoro mediums during the 
struggle for independence. Thus the guerrilla movements had won the hearts of the 
people. According to Lan (1958) to achieve the above the liberation fighters employed 
a dual-tier strategy: first, they established their own secret committees to win 
allegiance of chiefs followers and so transfer his support base to progressive anti-
government structures. Chiefs sympathetic to the government were often killed in the 
implementation of this strategy. Secondly, the guerrillas attacked chiefs' authority 
over land. Although in no position to themselves to allocate land, they won the 
population's support with promises of a new land dispensation favouring the peasants 
once the war had been won (Lan 1958:98). Thus during the transition to independence 
the Smith regime continued to give more powers to the chiefs but the majority of their 
people regarded their embroilment in modem national politics as a serious 
embarrassment because it compromised their position as local leaders of a 
community. Indeed, the effect of colonialism had reduced the traditional leaders to 
government bureaucrats as opposed to leaders of their communities. 
2.5.6 Democratising local governance whilst disempowering traditional leaders 
1980-1990 
In order for one to effectively analyse the role of traditional leadership in post 
independence land administration affairs, it is critical to focus on the period between 
1980 and 1990. Mandondo (2000) describes this era as the period of the 
disempowerment of chiefs (relegation). It therefore becomes imperative to highlight 











socio political contexts in order to examine why and how the disempowerment of 
traditional leaders happened. 
2.5.6.1 The significance of the 1980s 
One of the land mark events in the history of Zimbabwe was the Lancaster House 
Agreement. At this conference, held between September and December 1979, there 
were four delegations: that of the United Kingdom, that of Nkomo from ZAPU and 
Mugabe representing ZANU,and that of Bishop Muzorewa,which included several 
whites, including Ian Smith (Norman 2004:75). The significance of this agreement 
was that it laid out the constitutional frame work for Zimbabwe's first ten years of 
independence. This agreement reserved a fifth of the seats in parliament for whites, 
despite the fact that they then constituted less than 2% of the population (Carmody 
2001:79). 
Its other salient provision related to land which was one of the key sources of the 
liberation struggle in Zimbabwe following the settler occupation. For the first ten 
years of independence, all land was to be sold on a "willing buyer /wiling seller" basis 
at market values. Thus, white commercial farmers who owned the bulk of the land 
clung to their properties, even if they were not cultivating some parts yet on the other 
hand blacks were in dire need of land in the reserves. ZANU's election manifesto had 
proclaimed that "It is not only anti-people but criminal for any government to ignore 
the acute land hunger in the country, especially when it realised that 83 percent of our 
population live in the rural areas and depend on agriculture for their livelihood" 











In 1980,the Mugabe government, pursuing a policy of reconciliation with the whites 
and reconstruction for the benefit of black and white and facing a restrictive Lancaster 
House Independence constitution ,opted for a land resettlement programme which was 
based on a "willing seller wiling buyer" basis (Rukuni and Eicher 2001: 19). But a 
number of obstacles plagued the resettlement programme which also affected the rural 
communities. Land was costly and only a few farms were bought under the willing 
seller willing buyer stipulation under the Lancaster House constitution. Hence the 
peasants expectations were not met by government and this built some resentment to 
the state for lack of delivery. Although 20% of the land was purchased, it was not 
enough due to lack of resources. Further, the type of resettlement envisaged by the 
state was contradictory to what the peasants wanted. The peasants wanted an 
extension of communal land where communal tenure would obtain yet the 
government had a different perception of the new resettlement strategy. Hence, when 
the programme was implemented as we shall see later it met with some resistance 
from communities largely engineered by chiefs because its planning was top-down 
and did not recognise communal tenure where chiefs had a stake. 
2.5.6.2 Why did the state relegate the chiefs from land administration in the 
1980s? 
Mamdani (1996) argues that post -colonial states were either radical or conservative in 
their response to the "bifurcated state". Conservative nationalist regimes, he writes 
were content merely to inherit the urban civil society and to set about de-racialising it. 
They left rural communities as subjects. But radical regimes, on the other hand, 











institutions in the countryside. Ranger (1996) advances that whilst Mamdani does not 
mention Zimbabwe in his radical states as represented by Tanzania and Mozambique, 
however, Mamdani's analysis fits the decade of the 80s in Zimbabwe very well. 
Ranger1996:28 advances that after 1980 the victorious ZANU-PF determined to by 
pass traditional leaders altogether in their new system of rural participation. The new 
government was committed to social transformation on an international socialist 
model, and had nothing but scorn for "patriarchal" and "collaborationist" traditional 
authorities. At the local level, guerrilla-support committees and party committees 
seemed to have emerged as the key actors in the rural areas. It is against the above 
backdrop that the new government stripped the traditional leaders of their land 
administration powers. 
The issue of ignoring the institution of traditional authorities by the post independence 
government of Zimbabwe can be explained in the context of the historical role that 
chiefs played in the settler administration namely its association with the Smith 
regime. It can also be explained by the political ideology embraced by the newly 
elected ZANU-PF government when it came to power. Due to the fact that some 
traditional authorities were used against their people by the Smith regime, the new 
government viewed all traditional authorities as puppets of colonialism. Makumbe 
(1998) argues that the disempowerment of traditional leaders in the early 1980s was a 
measure purportedly adopted to punish chiefs for their pre-independence role as 
functionaries of colonial oppression. 
The idea of labelling chiefs as agents and stooges of the colonial regime grew out of 











traditional authorities attained following the entrenchment of "indirect rule". 
Mamdani (1996) argues that colonial masters used traditional leaders to consolidate 
settler rule and this compromised the position of the chiefs in their communities. On 
one hand they were supposed to obey the colonial masters though enforcement of 
suppressive laws, yet on the other hand they were expected to advance the peoples 
needs as leaders of their communities. 
It is during the late 19th century that most people viewed traditional authorities as 
agents of the state bent on enforcing rules and regulations from the colonial authority .. 
So when the new leaders came to power, they had the same view that traditional 
authorities were puppets of the previous regime and thus they were punished for their 
collaboration with the native commissioners. It is this stigma of having been 
associates of the Smith regime that the traditional authorities were stripped of their 
powers to allocate land following the promulgation of the Communal Lands Act 
(1982). A critical issue to note is that not all traditional authorities were collaborators 
of the Smith regime. Some resisted colonial oppression to the extent that they were 
deposed from their positions. A notable case in Bulilimamangwe district is that of the 
three Kalanga chiefs Masendu, Madlambudzi and Hikwa who were removed from 
their positions because they resisted the oppressive instructions of their colonial 
master (Plumtree District commissioner's reports 1969). 
The other issue with regard to traditional authorities in the 1980s can be explained 
against the background of the political and the development model adopted shortly 
after independence by the Zimbabwe government. According to Carmody (2001) at 











Leninism and scientific socialism which emphasised state control of the means of 
production and resources. Such a theory was inimical to traditional authorities and 
viewed it as undemocratic and reactionary. Mbaku (1999) calls this approach 
"statism" and argues that "many African leaders believed that tribalism was a 
hindrance to development hence it was necessary for them to form governments that 
could bring together competitive ethnic groups to provide a stable environment for 
economic growth and development. Many of these African elites opted for one-party 
political systems with strong central governments" (MbakuI999: 122).The above view 
confirms Mamdani' s argument (1996) that post -colonial states deracialised and some 
detribalised but did not democratise. Zimbabwe was one such an example and this 
explains why the Marxist-Leninist government relegated traditional authorities from 
rural local governance. 
2.5.6.3 The relegation of traditional leaders from land administration 
During the above decade, the new government enacted three principal pIeces of 
legislation which governed land use, allocation and planning in the communal areas. 
These were the District Councils Act (DCA) of 1980 the Communal Lands Act (CLA) 
of 1981 the Prime Minister's Directive (PMD) of 1984. What is crucial in the above 
instruments is that they all impinged negatively on the role of traditional leaders as 
land authorities in rural Zimbabwe. They all made no mention of the institution of 
traditional leaders, neither did they recognise it but instead strengthened the power of 












2.5.6.4 The District Councils Act (DCA) 
The DCA of 1980 brought in democratically elected district councils. The DCA also 
transferred land allocation powers from traditional authorities to district councils. 
Wekwete (1998) argues that "the rationale behind changing was to foster a sense of 
community and citizenship of the inhabitants of an area; to promote initiative and a 
sense of responsibility and to promote the development and economic progress or the 
area with the active participation of the inhabitants" (WekweteI988:22). What is 
worth noting is that the DCA undermined the traditional authorities by stripping their 
powers to allocate land. Further, the Act eroded the influence of traditional authorities 
by coming up with new village boundaries which in many instances varied with the 
traditional village setup. 
According to Keulder (1998) each district council area was divided into wards and 
villages. Each ward comprised approximately 6000 people, whilst a village comprised 
approximately 1000 people. All the wards were represented in the district council 
through a councillor at ward level, Ward Development Committees (WADCOS) 
served as a forum for village representatives. At village level, Village Development 
Committees (VIDCOS) were the development body charged with articulating village 
needs coordinating and presenting them to the W ADCO. In all the provisions of the 












2.5.6.5 The Communal Lands Act (CLA) 
The Communal Lands Act of 1981 according to Nyambara (1997) replaced communal 
land ownership (where the chief controlled the land on behalf of the community) in 
the communal lands with individual or state ownership. This Act vested ownership of 
communal land to the head of state and gave the District Councils the power to 
allocate and control land on his/her behalf. Cheater (1999) castigates the idea of 
vesting the ownership of communal land in one individual representing the state since 
it can be subject to abuse. To this end he argues that the state has unlimited control of 
communal land hence the whole issue of land administration is not democratic 
because the concerns of the poor can not be taken on board if the process does not 
devolve ownership to the communities themselves. The Act whilst specifying that 
existing land rights would be preserved, was however clear and elaborate in that the 
new permits to occupy communal land would be given by the District Councils. Thus 
the traditional leadership had been replaced by new institutions of democratically 
elected councils in land administration. In the eyes of the traditional leaders this was a 
heavy blow to their power base and existence as community leaders. Chief 
Mangwende had this to say to parliament after the promulgation of the Communal 
Lands Act: 
Zimbabwean chiefs will continue fighting for powers to allocate land. We will 
keep on talking until we are heard .. . You cannot be a chief without land 
... People should not think that the powers to allocate land have been taken 
away from chiefs for ever( quoted in Ranger 1993: 366). 
The above sounds like a protest speech from a representative of the traditional 











and legitimacy from the control of land administration. It is important to note Chief 
Mangwende's vociferous position on the recognition of traditional leaders for it was 
the same Chief who later became a member of the Rukuni Commission of 1993 that 
greatly influenced the birth of the Traditional Leaders Act and gave some land 
administration powers to the traditional authorities as we shall see later in the chapter. 
I argue that the chiefs utilised the opportunity presented by the Rukuni Commission to 
push for their come back and recognition by the state especially in land 
administration. It therefore came as no surprise why the recommendations were so 
much in favour of the traditional structures as we shall see later in the chapter because 
traditional authorities represented a large voting block. 
2.5.6.6 The Prime Minister's Directive 
In 1984 Robert Mugabe, the then Prime Minister of Zimbabwe issued a directive, 
outlining the institutional framework for development in rural Zimbabwe which like 
the already mentioned act completely ignored the presence of the traditional 
authorities. Democratically elected Village Development Committees (VIDCOs) were 
to be the basic planning unit in this new system of local government (Spierenburg 
2004:40). Each VIDCO would represent about 100 households. The VIDCO was to 
submit its development plans on an annual basis to the Ward Development committee 











Diagram 1: Institutional Structure established by the 1984 Prime Minister's Directive 
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This W ADCO would coordinate the plans from all VIDCOs under its jurisdiction. It 
would then submit the plans to the District Council for approval. The District Council 
would comprise all ward councillors that is the chairpersons of the W ADCOs. Once 
the district Council had approved the district plan after some technical input from a 
committee of technical staff from all ministries based in the district the District 
Development Committee (DDC), it was supposed to submit this plan to the provincial 
level the Provincial Development Committee (PDC) (Murombedzi 1992:24). 
Incidentally, the Prime ministers directive was also silent on the role of traditional 
leadership in this decentralized planning approach. Further, this policy document 
made no mention of their role in land administration or allocation. Such a function 
remained the responsibility of the District Councils and their elected structures (the 
VIDCOS and W ADCOS). Indeed the traditional leadership had been sidelined or 
ignored by the state since it had no legal role to play in land administration anymore. 
An analysis of the Prime Minister's directive reveals the following points. Mandondo 
(2000) argues that although the Prime Minister's directive gave peasant communities 
a system of representation in the process of planning for local development, political 
expediency subverted the democratic element of the system. Makumbe (1998) 
concurs by advancing that universal suffrage elects four of the six members of any 
Village development committee. The remaining two positions are reserved for women 
and the youth, and are usually filled by members of the ruling party's youth and 
women's league. According to Matowanyika (1991) the infiltration of VIDCOs and 
W ADCOs by the ruling ZANU-PF has seen them carry the stigma of "politically 











extensions of the ruling party. In the light of the above, I argue that the Prime 
Minister's directive whilst it attempted to make some governance structures 
representative, it failed to a large extent to make them accountable and democratic. 
The new structures were subjected to ZANUPF domination and state control in a top-
down fashion and this compromised their effectiveness on the ground. The 
government had embarked on a deliberate strategy to undermine traditional authorities 
whilst promoting elected structures in rural governance and this resulted III near 
collapse of rural administration as we shall see in the coming section. 
2.5.7 The effects of ignoring chiefs in rural administration and land allocation 
The idea of introducing elected leadership structures for example VIDCOs and 
W ADCOs in rural governance whilst excluding traditional leaders, came with a host 
of problems at community level particularly with regard to land administration. 
Although the operation of VIDCOs and W ADCOs differed from one place to another, 
generally, there were disgruntlements about lack of community/ local support and 
participation within these newly established leadership structures 
(Marongwe2002:58). Furthermore, the issue of disregarding traditional village 
boundaries in favour of the VIDCO boundaries was a source of conflict between the 
two leadership structures (Rukuni Commission Report 1994). 
2.5.7.1 Chiefs and the communal lands 
According to Ranger (1993), three themes emerge about the action of chiefs during 











spokesmen of the popular defence of the past or "tradition" against exclusionary state 
policies. Another is that chiefs and headmen were allocating land whether rightly or 
wrongly. A third is that there has been increasing conflict between the institution of 
traditional leadership and councils over land allocation (Ranger 1993:363). 
Ranger and Hobsbawn (1983:254) advance that "codified and reified custom was 
manipulated by particular groups of people to assert or increase social control. This 
happened in four particular situations: though it was not restricted to them. Elders 
tended to appeal to "tradition" in order to defend their dominance against the youth. 
Men appealed to "tradition" to maintain their domination over women. Chiefs in 
polities appealed to "tradition" in order to maintain or extend their control over their 
subjects. Indigenous populations appealed to "tradition" in order to ensure that the 
migrants who settled amongst them did not achieve political rights". The above 
strategy was employed by chiefs in Zimbabwe during the 80s when their land 
administration roles were threatened by the state and given to elected structures. 
2.5.7.2 The use of "tradition" by chiefs against the state 
The emphasis on tradition by chiefs became prevalent in the implementation of rural 
government programmes that were spearheaded by elected structures with the support 
of the civil servants. A good example of "re-inventing tradition" by chiefs was in the 
implementation of the land resettlement programme that started in the early 80s. 
During this period, chiefs, for example, chief Ndiweni and chief Makoni became very 
vocal in championing tradition whilst at the same time advocating for an extension of 











communal tenure. It should be remembered that due to the restrictions of the 
Lancaster House agreement the government could not fulfil the people's needs due to 
financial constraints and so the chiefs got sympathy from the people as they blamed 
the state for lack of service delivery. Citing from Beinart (1996) a case in Traskei 
where even peasant progressives and women who were disadvantaged by patriarchal 
traditionalism rallied around chiefs to protect communal tenure, Ranger (1996) argues 
that the same thing happened in Zimbabwe. Spierenburg (2004:46) also supports the 
above as she advances "traditional leaders invoked a version of the past where 
traditional leaders were the land authorities in a bid to challenge the authority of the 
state and local development bodies". 
Chiefs criticised government plans for resettlement since the government and the 
ZANUPF party had strongly repudiated any idea that resettlement areas should be in 
any sense an extension of communal areas. To many peasants the ideal was to add 
more land for grazing purposes and allow the expansion of communal tenure. It 
therefore came as no surprise that at a meeting in July 1984 at Ntabazinduna 
Matabeleland North between peasant farmers and government resettlement officers 
Chief Ndiweni had this to say: 
The government's resettlement policies are "un-African" and against the 
wishes of the people. Our people do not want resettlement all they want is an 
extension of the communal lands. Let the government buy adjacent farms and 
add them to communal lands so that people continue with their traditional and 
cultural values (Herald 27 July 1984). 
Many of the farmers and councillors present vigorously supported the chief. The 
above illustrates that despite the belief that chieftaincy could never again recover 











leverage support within communal areas. What we begin to see from traditional 
authorities is the championing of tradition, criticising of government resettlement 
programmes through advocating for additional land to communal areas to facilitate 
communal tenure as well as getting on with the business of allocating land in return 
for fees (Ranger1993:365). 
2.5.7.3 Chiefs and land allocation 
Ranger (1993) has shown that traditional leaders, continued to allocate land even if 
they were not mandated to do so by any legal instrument for example the Communal 
Lands Act (1982). Whilst the VIDCOS might have argued that they derive their land 
allocating powers from the Communal lands Act, the village heads (the lower tier 
level of traditional authorities in Zimbabwe) on the other claimed that historically this 
land has always belonged to their clan for generations. Thus, we now had two land 
authorities (traditional leaders and the elected structures) splitting the community into 
camps, those in favour of VIDCOS and supporting traditional authorities. It is during 
the1980s that the struggle between the traditional and elected leadership intensified all 
centred on the power to control land. 
Traditional authorities did not want to recognise the legal function of the elected 
structures over land whilst the latter saw no rationale as to why the traditional 
authorities defied government policy. What is worth noting here is that, perhaps the 
behaviour of traditional authorities might have been influenced by greed for gifts as 
well as incentives and some community members who despite the new dispensation 











teething problem. This issue was unearthed by the submissions to the Rukuni Land 
Commission of 1993. It is confirmed that "in times of trouble some people, 
particularly women by-pass the VIDCOs and go to the chief or kraal head for help" 
(Rukuni Land Commission Volume One Main Report 1994:27). 
The significance of the description above is that leaders earn their respect and 
credibility through what they do for their people. It indicates two important aspects of 
rural local governance. Firstly it demonstrates that the intentions of legislated 
instruments are not always practised on the ground since some people might disobey 
them as demonstrated by the behaviour of traditional authorities in the 1980s. 
Secondly it proves Sindane's theory (2004) that "the legitimacy and survival of 
traditional authorities depends on the services and the quality thereof they can 
provide, and their impact on the lives of those interests they claim to represent, and 
not so much on a constitutional provision" (Sindane (2004: 155). 
2.5.7.4 Tensions and conflicts in rural governance 
Nyambara(1997) sums up the 1980s as follows: "In fact ,this period witnessed the re-
emergence ,albeit in an invigorated state ,of the madiro lumathanda (do as you please) 
ideology ,this time the feeling was that independence had been won and everyone was 
free to grab as much land as was available"(NyambaraI997:16). He argues that in 
Gokwe there were many players involved in land administration ranging from chiefs, 
headmen, councillors, party cadres and village heads. The effect of this was that rural 
local governance was almost on the verge of collapse due to lack of cohesion and 











subsequently caused confusion and conflict between the elected and traditional 
authorities. 
Ranger (1993) argues that during the 1980s, there was an absence of effective control 
by the state. He notes that "the actualities of land allocation, title, and land holding 
vary greatly from place to place in Zimbabwe's communal areas, according to the 
balance of power between chiefs, headmen, councillors, "squatters". He goes further 
to illustrate his point: 
In practice, what was experienced on the ground was a relaxation of central 
control ... as chiefs and headmen and entrepreneurs and village committees 
and peasant households were all involved in the process of land allocation, 
appropriation and use in the communal lands (Ranger 1993:362). 
It then became apparent that indeed the post-independence government had 
detribalised but failed to democratise. The other worrying issue was the proliferation 
of homesteads in grazing areas or in unsuitable sloppy or swampy areas. A letter from 
the Herald newspaper in January 1988 from a proud son of Chiweshe District 
summarises this confusion: 
Places where we used to graze cattle and go puddle-swimming have turned 
into ploughing land and dwellings .Rivers which we used to catch fish have 
been become receptacles of eroded soil, and hills that once boasted thick 
bushes and trees have now degenerated into passage ways The aim behind the 
VIDCOs is no doubt noble but they have been grossly misdirected in their 
efforts. More often than not these VIDCOs are staffed by land-hungry 
youngsters who will not show any restraint (Herald 22 January 1988 quoted 
from Ranger1993:367). 
The above quote whilst it shows the extent of damage within communal lands that this 
era witnessed, it seems biased against the VIDCOs. The impression one gets from the 











land. In essence the problems of this era lie squarely on the doors of the both elected 
structures such as the VIDCOs and traditional authorities. 
In the meantime the problems of land degradation, random and illegal settlements 
continued in the communal areas as no one controlled this catastrophe. The elected 
structures lacked authority and grip on the communities because they were new. They 
also lacked human and financial resources and support from the government hence 
they fell out of favour with the communities. 
It should be noted that the support rendered to the traditional leaders by communities 
was not because they were more efficient or legitimate than the elected structures but 
because the latter were constrained by lack of resources and lack of support from the 
state. To illuminate this point Alexander advances that "W ADCOS enjoyed very little 
support from the state and the people in terms of financial resources" 
(Alexander1995: 13). Thus, they failed to deliver the expected services to the people 
because they were not accountable to the communities but to the party. 
Traditional authorities capitalised on this weakness and re-asserted their authority to 
allocate land under customary law although it was illegal as far as the new land 
administration laws were concerned. Furthermore, most government programmes did 
not receive community support as the traditional leadership structure was boycotting 
them under the banner that the modern elected structures were against tradition and 
the traditional authorities. 











control, communal lands were characterised by widespread abuse of power. There 
was no order and control in the allocation as both leadership structures 
indiscriminately dished out land. Consequently, a lot of conflicts emerged between 
the two structures over land utilisation and control subsequently stifling development 
within communal areas. Spierenburg (2004) advances that due to the above confusion 
in the communal areas; land tenure became less and less clear since there were too 
many players in land administration each with a different agenda. In reaction to the 
above problems experienced by communities on the ground, the government of 
Zimbabwe in 1993 setup a Commission of Inquiry into Appropriate Agricultural 
Systems which was later dubbed the Rukuni Land Commission. This then leads us to 
the era of the 1990s the era that saw the resurgence of traditional leaders. 
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown the role of traditional leaders and land administration in pre-
colonial colonial Zimbabwe. It also showed how this structure was bureaucratised by 
the colonial masters and converted from leaders of the people to mere agents or 
officials of the state. It has been argued that not all traditional leaders were 
democratic. The chapter went further to demonstrate following independence in 1980 
why and how the new government reduced the powers of traditional leaders. It has 
been argued that the decade of the 1980s was a period where the government of 
Zimbabwe implemented a deliberate strategy to give more powers to elected 
structures at the expense of traditional leaders. To this end the chapter has shown the 
effects of ignoring traditional leaders in rural governance and how this affected rural 












TOW ARDS CO-EXISTENCE, THE RE-IMERGENCE OF 
TRADITIONAL LEADERS THE DECADE OF THE 1990s TO 
PRESENT 
3.1 Introduction 
The chapter is about the re-emergence of traditional leaders in rural governance 
following some years of neglect. It begins with some examination of the events and 
processes that led the Mugabe government to have a change of heart towards 
traditional leaders. To illuminate the above, the chapter examines the global, political 
and economic environment. It further gives an analysis of the pieces of legislation that 
supported the recognition of traditional leaders notably the Rukuni Commission and 
the Traditional Leaders Act (2000). Against such a backdrop, the chapter argues that 
during this era the elected structures were stripped of some of their powers and given 
to traditional leaders. The chapter finally evaluates the co-existence approach between 
the elected and the traditional leaders as enunciated by the Traditional Leaders Act 
(2000). 
3.2 The significance of the 1990s in Zimbabwe 
The reasons for the turn around strategy by the Mugabe government to recognise 
traditional authorities should be understood in the context of the events and processes 
that took place in the global, political and economic climate surrounding Zimbabwe. 
The notable events of the 1990s were decentralisation, the structural adjustments 











to have had a bearing on the recognition of traditional leaders by the Zimbabwe 
government. 
3.2.1 Decentralisation 
The recognition of traditional leaders in Zimbabwe can not be isolated from the 
general re-emergence of traditional and customary authorities on the African 
continent in particular. Ntsebeza (2006) argues that this resurgence of traditional 
authorities is often associated with the advent of multi-party democracy and 
decentralisation in the early 1990s. Countries which were initially hostile towards 
traditional authorities found themselves recognising them. Mozambique is sited as a 
pertinent example and Zimbabwe was no exception. Conyers and Matovu (2002) 
advance that the government of Zimbabwe reaffirmed its commitment to the 
decentralisation process (where communities are gIven greater participation III 
decisions that affect their lives directly), in a major policy statement in 1996. 
When government reaffirmed commitment to this decentralisation process, it went on 
to enunciate the thirteen principles for use by ministries and departments in their 
transfer of powers to the local authorities. What is worth noting is that a new kind of 
globalisation (neoliberalism) developed in the 1990s after the fall of the Soviet Union 
when capitalism became the only game in town. The new thinking brought in 
decentralisation which meant cutting back the influence of the state as the sole 
provider for communities. This meant some severe cuts on social expenditure thus 
leaving very little resources for the rural poor. The question that arises when one talks 











communities? Traditional authorities come to the fore as one tries to answer the above 
question especially in the light of the fact that the elected structures did not succeed in 
improving rural community lives in the 1980s as shown in chapter two. It is against 
such background that the state recognised traditional authorities. Thus we now begin 
to see some recognition of traditional authorities at a time where there was increasing 
pressure from the World Bank on post-colonial governments to decentralise powers 
from the centre (state) to the periphery. 
3.2.2 The Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) 
With the worsening economic crisis of the late 1980s, and the growing hegemony of 
neo-liberalism, in 1991 the Zimbabwe government introduced standard economic 
structural reforms. Decentralisation had become an important component of public 
sector reforms being promoted by World Bank and other donors. Sachikonye 
(2000)argues that the adoption of the structural adjustment reforms in the 1990s was 
because, by the late 1980s the Zimbabwean economy was experiencing formidable 
structural problems whose manifestations included mediocre export performance, low 
investment, high unemployment and an unsustainable budget deficit and government 
debt (Sachikonye2000: 1). It is important to mention that it was in response to these 
structural bottlenecks in its economy that the Zimbabwe government launched ESAP 
in the 1990s. But how did such a programme impact on the lives of the rural people? 
The economic austerity measures pursued under ESAP could not fail to have an 
impact on workers access to basic social services such as social services and 
education (Sachikonye 2000:13). Whilst the1980s experienced some substantial 











there was contraction In serVIce delivery which adversely affected the rural 
communities. In the eyes of the communities the government had failed because the 
ESAP programmes were concerned with austerity measures rather than with growth 
or participatory governance. Carmody (2001) argues that in adopting ESAP the state 
acted in a rational bureaucratic (Weberian) manner. Hence we now begin to see the 
government trying to court traditional leaders in order to cushion itself from the 
problems of ESAP. 
3.2.3 The political situation in the 1990s and the global context 
One major characteristic of this decade is that the global, political and economic 
climate had changed dramatically from what it was in the previous decade. On the 
economic sphere, as Webster 2002 puts it, "the decade was marked by reduced public 
sector expenditures, increased pressure on rural local authorities to raise revenue and 
growing poverty."(Webster and Pedersen2002: 135). With regard to the political 
dimension, the1990s in Zimbabwe marked a turning point in the political history of 
the country as the first strong opposition to the dominant ZANUPF party was 
established. It is important to mention that the only meaningful opposition party 
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) gained momentum in the late 1990s. Thus 
we now begin to see some change of heart by the state towards the traditional 
authorities in order to win the support of rural communities against opposition. This 
explains why we also begin to see the enactment of the Traditional Leaders Act 












In the global context, the 1990s marked the end of the Cold War and this meant that 
the ideology of Marxism-Leninism had to be done away with. Ntsebeza (2006) 
advances that there is a sense in which it is true to say that the late 1980s and 1990s 
was a triumph for the forces of global neo-liberal capitalism. The Cold War had come 
to an end with the demise of the Soviet Union and capitalism became the only system 
dominating the world (the only game in town). Consequently ZANU-PF with its 
Marxist-Leninism ideology was left stranded. The capitalist economic system and the 
political system that goes with it (multi-party democracy) now became the dominant 
forces in the world. In the light of the above, developing countries were to seek 
financial support from the capitalist West which came with tied conditions. 
Thus, in a period of 7 years, "twenty nine of the forty eight African countries south of 
the Sahara embraced multiparty political systems advocated by the West 
(Reynolds 1999: 1). There was also a push for the developing countries to embrace 
decentralisation and Economic Structural Adjustment Programmes (ESAP). It is 
during this era that Zimbabwe embarked on decentralisation and ESAP as already 
shown above largely under the influence of the World Bank. It therefore becomes 
imperative for one to explain the re-emergence of traditional authorities during the 
1990s against the above background. Two critical policy initiatives that emerged 
during this decade in favour of traditional leaders are the Rukuni Commission Report 











3.3 Towards co-existence: traditional leaders and the Rukuni Land 
Commission 
Due to the problems created by undermining the role of traditional authorities in rural 
governance as already demonstrated in chapter two the government instituted a 
commission to harmonise communal land administration which was later dubbed the 
Rukuni Commission. Alexander (1995: 13) argues that by formulating an agenda 
based on a popular revival of "tradition", traditional leaders were able to draw on a 
constituency that found itself threatened by the new agricultural policies. Traditional 
authorities certainly did not reject all aspects of the modern state, but reacted to the 
authoritarian implementation policies and loss of control over land. Thus he further 
advances that traditional leaders invoked a version of the past in a bid to challenge the 
authority of the state and local development bodies (the elected structures) in land 
administration. 
For example chiefs continued to allocate land despite the new land administration acts 
which were not clear on land tenure. As a result, too many players in land 
administration sprouted ranging from chiefs, headmen, party officials, VIDCOs, 
councillors and village heads thus creating confusion in the domain of land 
administration. It is important to mention that the call to set up a commission was 
triggered by the profusion of overlapping and incongruent local organisational 
structures mentioned above as they jostled for power to control land. The other reason 












The Commission was set up in 1993 through statutory instrument 383 of 1993 and 
was sworn in by President R G Mugabe at state house on 1 November1993.In order to 
accomplish its mission the Commission was given a year from November 1993 to 
November 1994. It was composed of 12 members drawn from a wide spectrum of the 
society. The team was chaired by Professor Rukuni an expert in agricultural science 
and was deputised by Mr Magadzire also a renowned agriculturalist. What is 
interesting to note is that the majority of the members who were represented as a 
block were four chiefs (Chief Mangwende, Chief ChifambaGutu, Chief Mafu and 
Chief Musikavanhu). The presence of such a significant proportion of traditional 
leaders is worth noting especially in relation to the recommendations that were 
advanced by the Commission in relation to traditional authorities and land 
administration as we shall see later. 
I argue that the number of chiefs in the Commission gave them a comparative 
advantage as a voting block to influence the re-emergence of traditional leaders. It 
should also be remembered from chapter two that it was the same chief Mangwende 
who made a strong speech in parliament against the marginalisation of chiefs in land 
administration that became a member of the Commission. In my opinion an 
opportunity had now arrived for the traditional leaders to ensure that their demands 
are finally heard. In the light of the above, it would appear that the recommendations 
of the commission were largely influenced by the chiefs' call to re-assert themselves 
in rural governance. This may have given chiefs an advantage over other sectors of 
the community in shaping the powers they finally got through the enactment of the 











The major terms of reference of the Commission were as follows: 
.:. To consider the appropriateness or otherwise of each of the land tenure 
systems, 1.e. communal, resettlement permit, leasehold and freehold title in 
relation to sustainable resource management, farm productivity and 
investment. 
.:. To consider experiences from the existing land tenure systems as well as from 
the experiences of other countries, and recommend the most suitable land 
tenure system that is suitable for each farming sector. 
.:. To recommend appropriate institutional arrangements for the administration of 
each of the proposed land tenure systems for each of the farming sector taking 
into account existing legislative arrangements . 
• :. To consider the need or otherwise of the new legislative measures to bring the 
recommended land tenure systems into effect. 
In order to achieve the above terms of reference, the Commission used the following 
sources of information: 
.:. Written submissions from selected central government officials and civic 
organizations . 











.:. International visits to other countries notably to gam expenences on land 
tenure . 
• :. Technical research studies on tenure and holding of workshops with experts or 
consultants on tenure systems. 
3.3.1 Findings and recommendations of the Commission 
The Commission found out that the highly centralised levels of governance, combined 
with bureaucratic top-down decision making systems, tended to impose decisions on 
the people at grassroots levels. This system of governance was also weak in terms of 
effectiveness and impact, accountability and transparency as it denied the people the 
chance to be self innovative. Thus, the system of land administration was showing 
signs of stress due to problems that existed from national to local levels. Flowing from 
this, it was clear that government ministries had centralised administrative 
mechanisms with a narrow ministerial top-down approach to rural development. 
What came out clearly from the findings of the Commission was that to a great extent 
the problems affecting the communal lands were largely a result of failure by state 
laws to recognise the institution of traditional leadership in land administration and 
lack of clarity from state laws on which tenure system is applicable in the communal 
areas. It was also found out that the conflicts between the traditional and elected 
leadership led to a breakdown of laws on effective management of natural resources 











The Commission also found out that the legal and administrative structures in 
communal land had collapsed because of lack of clarity of roles and functions of 
various institutions at local levels over issues of land administration. There was 
evidence that the dissolution of traditional authority in land and natural resources 
matters at independence was premature and, currently there was widespread resistance 
to VIDCO/w ADCO structures as credible authorities over land administration affairs 
The VIDCO was widely viewed as an illegitimate structure, with no credibility of 
respect, nor real effective power and resources to implement the said roles. 
It was also found out that customary tenure had been weakened by the designation of 
communal areas as state land. This has allowed government to pay less respect to 
traditional land rights as seen through land displacements with minimal consultation 
and compensation, as well as imposition of alien forms of land authority such as 
VIDCOs. In most cases this had damaged relations among communities and between 
village heads and VIDCO leader. 
The other burning issue was that the vast majority of people in the communal areas 
believed that the delineation of VIDCO boundaries ignored the existence of traditional 
villages and VIDCO boundaries often split traditional villages. Most people believed 
that the authentic boundaries are those of the traditional village under a village head. 
This is the area representing the basic social grouping with common ownership of 
land, grazing, forest areas, watering points and sacred areas. 
It was uncovered that over time communal areas had gravitated towards traditional 











of modern structures. In the light of the above, it became apparent that recognising 
traditional authorities in land allocation will be the starting point to resolve the above 
problems which meant the recognition of traditional land tenure where the traditional 
leader is the land authority. It is against the backdrop of the above findings that the 
Commission drew up a number of recommendations. 
3.3.2 The key recommendations of the Rukuni Land Commission Report 
The recommendations of the Commission can be categorised into two main areas: 
those that relate to tenure system in communal areas and its legal and administrative 
institutions and the recommendations for legislative and administrative reforms. 
3.3.2.1 Tenure System 
The Commission recommended that communal tenure be maintained and 
strengthened through a series of measures that would improve security of tenure and 
improve the legal and administrative mechanisms necessary for long-term evolution 
of the system to meet the challenging needs. Traditional freehold tenure for arable and 
residential areas is secure and this security should improve if the state relinquishes its 
ownership of communal land. This means that the key set of rights under traditional 
freehold tenure should be formalised to include inheritance, sub-division and 
receiving compensation for loss of improvements. In this light the Commission 
believed that by strengthening village level institutions under the traditional 
leadership structure, management of grazing and other communally owned natural 











3.3.2.2 Legal Tenure Institutions 
The Commission recommended that existing legislation on communal land rights for 
the communities and households be amended to strengthen the security of tenure 
Statutory laws have to be cognisant of customary law on land which is still widely 
practiced and any new or consolidated laws will have to encode at lest the common 
principles of customary law and the spirit behind the law. Customary law and 
procedures have to be continually understood, codified and formalised for 
enforcement in rural areas. 
It was also recommended that the basic legal principles should include the 
continuation of traditional freehold rights over arable and residential land and these 
rights should include the right to receive compensation for improvements when a 
household leaves a community. The legal rights for arable, residential and grazing 
areas must be held by the head of the family in trust for the rest of the family. Heads 
of household may therefore not dispose of or subdivide arable or residential land 
without consent of the spouse and dependent children. 
3.3.2.3 Administrative Tenure Institutions 
The Commission strongly recommended that government recognise the traditional 
village, which should be constituted under the village head as the basic unit of 
organisation in communal areas. Members of a traditional village should be given 
formal perpetual rights over land and all resources in each village. A schedule of 











updated on permanent record. The village community must have the discretion to 
accept of reject new persons or families wishing to enter its community. 
The Commission recommended that the administrative functions on land and natural 
resources be shifted from VIDCOs to the traditional village where the structure of a 
village "Inkundla" (Ndebele) is to be formalised to act as the local land, water and 
natural resources board. All adult male and female members of a village should be 
members of the Village Assembly "Izakhamizi"in Ndebele. The Village Assembly 
shall elect members of the Inkundla with the Village head as Chairman for the 
Inkundla. 
On dealing with issues of land, water and natural resources, the Inkundla will be 
assisted by any relevant civil servants who will have no vote, but provide technical 
advice and assist with the design and maintenance of record keeping systems .The 
Village Assembly meets less frequently to deal with major policy issues on land, 
water and natural resources. 
The Commission therefore recommended the recognition of Village heads as the 
lowest level of traditional leaders, reporting to the Headmen and Chief. This 
recognition and functions should be clearly spelt out in the law, also stating the 
procedures of appointment, expected code of conduct, and disciplinary measures in 
case of misconduct and abuse. It is also essential for the Inkundla to be formalised in 
the primary or local court system. 











cost techniques demonstrated by surveyors to the Commission. The surveying of land 
would start with the adjudication and mapping of traditional villages which should 
ultimately receive a village registration title. This was to formalise village boundaries 
and minimise boundary disputes. Such an exercise would require a lot of consultation 
with the communities and some significant amount of money. However, the 
Commission recommended that ward boundaries be altered in line with the old 
boundaries that coincided with chiefs and headmen areas prior the changes brought 
about by the District Councils Act of 1980. 
In the final analysis the Commission recommended that, in the medium to long term, 
villages or districts which have fulfilled requirements for effective village level land 
administration as outlined above should cease to be state land and all land in 
communal areas should ultimately be traditional village land to offer a more accurate 
reflection. 
3.3.2.4 Recommendations on the Legislative framework 
The Commission recommended that the considerable number of laws on land and 
natural resources be consolidated and streamlined. In the process there is need for one 
major reference legislation on land, which overrides and guides all other legislation. 
The reference legislation could be referred to as the Land Act which will basically 
establish modalities for control of land, its use, its distribution and its administration. 
In addition, the Land Act shall monitor and enforce sustainable land and resource use 
management. This Act will also create a number of institutions to administer land at 











3.3.2.5 Recommendations on the Administrative system 
In VIew of the recommendations on the legislative frame work the Commission 
envisaged that an appropriate administrative framework is one that is effectively 
decentralised in authority and function. The Commission therefore recommends that 
The Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Water Development be the principal ministry 
to administer the proposed Land Act. The department of Lands be established as soon 
as possible and that all responsibilities for land within the Ministry of Local 
Government and Rural Development be transferred forthwith to this Department to 
arrest overlap conflicts and inefficiency. 
The Commission also recommended that the proposed Department of Lands be 
decentralised to provincial and rural district levels. Land boards serviced by this 
Department should be established at village ward district province and national levels 
should be established and deal with all land administration issues in a transparent 
manner. 
3.3.3 What was the significance of the Rukuni Commission? 
It is critical to note that although the government accepted the report not all the 
recommendations were implemented. It seems all the recommendations on the 
administrative tenure systems except the issue of revisiting traditional boundaries 
were taken with interest. Surprisingly, those recommendations pertaining to 
legislative framework and those on the administrative system were completely 
ignored. Another critical issue neglected was the transformation of communal land 












Generally it has been observed that consensus building and broad consultations on 
land policy issues since independence in Zimbabwe have been limited (Moyo 1996). 
Marongwe (1999) advances that the Rukuni Commission presented a step towards a 
broader consultation process concerning the most pressing land problems. However, 
he believes that the commission was limited in terms of wider forms as well as issues 
covered. His contention is that the commission addressed mainly tenure issues but 
failed to consider other crucial matters pertaining to land grievances, land based 
conflicts, and conflict resolution mechanisms. It has been pointed out that women in 
particular were not adequately represented in the commission and that most 
consultations were with men. In the light of the above, Marongwe believes that the 
commission did not address the real pertinent issues since transient commissions can 
not permanently resolve such crucial land issues as has been the tendency in 
Zimbabwe. The major challenge is one of developing long term institutional capacity 
to address the issues on an on-going basis rather than rely on Commissions. 
Adams, Sibanda and Turner (1999) believe that Cabinet accepted advice that 
communal land tenure system be maintained but did not accept the state should 
relinquish the dejure ownership of communal land, but agreed that village 
communities should instead have perpetual usufruct rights of communal land. As 
already shown ownership and control of communal land signifies great influence and 
power over communities because their live revolve on land. Viewed against this 
backdrop, it will be difficult for the state to let go of land because this will be 











surpnse why the government accepted only those recommendations that did not 
threaten its power or hegemony. 
My analysis of the recommendations reveals that the state was comfortable with those 
that would maintain the state superiority over the traditional leadership system. The 
International Crisis Group (2004) confirms that overall, the cabinet response to the 
Commission's response was slow and incomplete and the government rejected any 
recommendations viewed as a threat to its broad powers over land allocation. 
The fact of the matter is that traditional authorities even if they have been recognised 
by the Traditional Leaders Act (2000), they can not solely sanction land allocation 
without the consent of council an elected institution and land authority. Traditional 
authorities have always clamoured for village community ownership of communal 
land as opposed to the state ownership. They also insist on the alteration of the current 
boundaries in the communal lands so that they coincide with chiefs and headmen 
areas for easy policing of traditional land tenure. Both the above recommendations 
including the one on the formulation of the Land Act (2000) were not considered. The 
reason for this is that perhaps the state wants to keep control of the traditional 
leadership structure by monopolising the ownership of communal land. As mentioned 
earlier he or she who owns communal land has power because it is the lifeblood of 
rural communities. This might explain why the state does not want to let go of 
communal land ownership. 
My assessment of the recommendations of the Rukuni Commission reveals that the 











opposed to the Rural District Council (RDC). The communities opted for traditional 
land ownership but what is striking is that the Zimbabwe government in its quest to 
maintain social control of rural administration ignored substantially this crucial issue 
from the rural folk. Instead, the government chose to modify the recommendations to 
suit its agenda of social control. Perhaps this explains why the sub district elected 
structures were kind of fused and subordinated into the traditional leadership structure 
following the new dispensation brought about by the TLA (2000) as shall be seen 
later. Flowing from the above, I argue that the Rukuni Commission advanced crucial, 
relevant and pertinent recommendations but the problem is that the state only 
considered those that did not threaten its hegemony over the traditional authorities and 
the rural communities to maintain social control. 
3.3.3.1 Towards recognising traditional leaders 
The report on the findings of the Rukuni Commission became a public document in 
1995. This document was indeed the foundation for which some government policy 
initiatives were born. It therefore came as no surprise when in his speech to 
parliament on 4 May 1995; the President Mugabe stated that traditional leaders would 
receive the following powers: 
.:. Village heads and headmen will chair the proposed village and ward 
assemblies. These proposed assemblies will superintend the work of the 












.:. Chiefs, headmen and village heads will be responsible for the general 
maintenance of law and order and for ensuring "good governance "in respect 
of all traditional matters 
.:. Traditional leaders will administer resettlement and communal areas . 
• :. They will assist the Councils in the allocation of land, prevent unauthorised 
resettlement in the communal areas and ensure the preservation of the 
environment. 
.:. They will collect levies, taxes and other charges payable to the Rural District 
councils. (Parliament of Zimbabwe 1995:6) 
Drawing from the nature of powers proposed, one realises that it is only those 
administrative roles that seemed palatable to the state that would carry the day. The 
proposed roles signify that traditional leaders can be used effectively to enhance state 
capacities and thereby play an important part in strengthening a weak local 
administration (Keulderl997). My interpretation of the President's speech is that the 
head of state was in a way revealing which recommendations of the Rukuni 
commission would see the day and which ones will not. It was quite apparent that the 
government was less keen on those recommendations that would strengthen the 
traditional authorities' sole power over land due to fear of losing social control. Thus, 
in a way Commission recommendations influenced government in the formulation of 











The proposals as enunciated by the President in his parliamentary speech were 
basically the same provisions of the Traditional Leaders Act as it obtains today. This 
then proves that the proposals were indeed a signal of which recommendations would 
be considered by government. It also signifies that traditional leaders might have re-
asserted their influence in the land commission as a majority voting block and greatly 
influenced the recommendations in their favour. 
3.3.3.2 The birth of the Traditional Leaders Act 
In 1998 the government of Zimbabwe passed the Traditional Leaders Act (TLA) in 
response to some of the recommendations made by the Commission particularly with 
regard to land administration in the communal areas. The Act marked the beginning 
of the recognition of traditional authorities in rural governance whilst at the same time 
eroding some powers of the elected structures. According to Spierenburg 2004, the 
new act proposed the establishment of village and ward assemblies consisting of all 
adult village and ward inhabitants. 
The assemblies are chaired by village heads and headmen. VIDCOs now became 











Diagram 2: The recognition of Traditional Leadership in Local Government 











Chaired by Governor 
\> 
Provincial Development 
Committee chaired by the 
Provincial Administrator 
RDC/uC 
Chaired by chairperson 








(W A) Chaired 
by Headmen c/p 
11 
Village Assembly (VA) 




Committee (W ADCO) 
Chaired by councillor of 
respective wards 
D 
Village Dev. Committee 




















Provincial Heads of 
sector ministries 














The ward assembly consists of all traditional leaders (headmen and village heads) in a 
given ward. The chairperson of the assembly is elected on its ranks. Its main function 
is to consolidate all the village plans from the village assemblies for integration into 
the rural district development plans. The above structure is serviced by the councillor 
(an elected representative) as its secretariat thus providing a link with the rural district 
council. 
Below this structure lies the village assembly the governing body of the village. The 
village assembly is a forum where all residents above the age of 18 meet to consider 
developmental issues. Its main functions are to help the rural district council in the 
allocation of land and also adopt development plans from its technical committee 
(VIDCO). The village assembly is chaired by the village head (a hereditary lower tier 
structure of the institution of traditional leadership ). 
What is critical to note is that the Traditional Leaders Act brought in a new window of 
participatory democracy in the form of Inkundla (village assembly) within local 
government. Such a forum presented communities with a platform to air their views 
and concerns on village issues. It is a place where the voices of the people are heard 
since the structure is open to any resident of the village irrespective of sex as long as 
the person is above the age of 18. The issue of integrating village elected structures 
(VIDCOs) under traditional structures (Village and Ward Assemblies) is a unique 
development in the region because in Botswana, Namibia, Mozambique, Zambia and 
South Africa the opposite is true. Many a times the traditional leadership has been 
associated with patriarchy which discriminates against women and the youth but with 











groups are gIven the opportunity to participate in rural governance. It therefore 
becomes interesting to note this shift and ability to combine a hereditary structure and 
a democratically elected system of governance. Perhaps this goes to show that the 
institution of traditional leadership is not incompatible with the principles of 
democracy and can coexist with elected structures in contemporary local governance 
provided one strikes a balance between the two. To this end, the Traditional Leaders 
Act in a way tried to reconcile the overlaps and the role conflict /authority between 
traditional leaders and the elected structures of VIDCOs and W ADCOs. 
Critics of the above dispensation have however noted that some of the consultative 
processes within the Village and Ward Assemblies are smokescreens and ends rather 
than means of arriving at decisions based on a collective vision (Chatiza 2003).The 
argument is that the structures have not really empowered communities. Such critics 
have been on the basis of a number of points, Murombedzi (1997). First, the structures 
did not respect the existing territorial jurisdictions of they defined planning units 
using demography rather than geography and in the process disturbed the boundaries 
that defined association of life and identities. The traditional village forms a viable 
basis for relationships and identity both of which are critical for defining communities 
and act as central component of social capital essential for planning and managing 
community development. Second, is the aspect of rampant abuse of the structures by 
bureaucrats who use them as means of community mobilisation, institutions of rubber 
stamping and policy implementation rather than vehicles for land administration and 
participatory development. Spierenburg (2004) views the W ADCOs vis-a-vis 
traditional leadership as less clear and this might cause a problem of role overlaps. In 











ambiguity with respect to land authority in communal lands. 
3.3.3.3 An analysis of the Traditional Leaders Act 
One would think that now that the institution of traditional leadership has been 
recognised in land administration following the enactment of the Traditional Leaders 
Act, the problems of rural governance are now history. Whilst one appreciates the 
recognition of traditional authorities particularly in land administration, it is also 
important to highlight the shortcomings of the Act. It appears that the Traditional 
Leaders Act did not in essence empower traditional authorities on the issue of 
communal land administration because as it stands now communal land allocation and 
its disposal rights can not be effected without the sanction of the Rural District 
Council which is entirely controlled by elected representatives (councillors) on behalf 
of the state. Thus, the new structures village and ward assemblies seem to have 
strengthened the planning role of traditional leadership rather than its powers on land 
administration and natural resources management because they do not have any 
decision making mandate outside the Rural District Council which is the land 
authority. 
According to Rugege (2003) although traditional leadership was recognised to work 
in close liaison with the elected representatives in communal land administration 
following the promulgation of the Traditional Leaders Act (2000) in Zimbabwe, (the 
traditional bodies) Village and Ward Assemblies do not have implementation powers. 
In the cases of land administration affairs, the Rural District Council still has the final 











Communal land tenure is still vested with the state than with the traditional authorities 
a situation that still renders traditional authorities weak. 
Katerere(2004) in a bid to illuminate the problems brought about by the Traditional 
Leaders Act on traditional authorities argues that: 
Chiefs are appointed to preside over their communities and to perform the 
functions of their office as traditional heads of the community. The Act does 
not define what these functions are and so at first glance although it seems 
that their roles in rule making, adjudication, mediation and distribution of 
resources have been restored this is in fact not the case .In respect of natural 
resources this responsibility has been located elsewhere ... to state technical 
and managerial agencies, local government authorities, parliament and 
centralised ministries (Katerere 2004:9) 
Her perception IS that the Traditional Leaders Act (2000) reduces the traditional 
authorities to mere implementer or enforcer of state regulations with no authority to 
make rules that can be enforced legally without his support of the Rural District 
Council (RDC) the land authority. 
In short the Traditional Leaders Act was not a long lasting solution to the issue of land 
allocation and control in the communal areas of Zimbabwe. As shall be shown in 
chapter four traditional leadership still feels that the idea of jointly allocating land 
with state agencies like the RDC is a political motive by the state to control the 
traditional leadership's freedom in land management a responsibility they long 
enjoyed prior to independence. Their position is that the government should fully 
recognise traditional or communal land tenure instead of the current lip service where 
they are still subjected to state control. Indeed the issue of who is who in land 











RDC still remains a bone of contention in contemporary Zimbabwe. As Metcalfe 
(1996) puts it, "the point of interface between traditional and modern land 
administration systems still remains an unresolved issue". Be that as it may, the fact 
that the Traditional Leaders Act recognised traditional leaders through the formation 
of Village and Ward Assemblies chaired by hereditary leaders and overseeing elected 
structures poses a serious challenge to democracy. The other problem of the co-
existence approach is linked to the mechanisms of accountability of traditional 
authorities. The critical question is how rural communities hold traditional structures 
accountable in case of any dissatisfaction? Flowing from the above, my analysis of 
the Traditional Leaders Act is that it modernised traditional leaders but did not 
democratise rural governance. 
Ntsebeza (2006) advances that upholding the principles of democracy whilst also 
recognising the traditional authorities (a hereditary structure) is a contradiction. He 
calls the scenario "democracy compromised". But why do most post-colonial 
governments recognise traditional authorities whilst at the same time uphold the 
principle of representative democracy? I argue that most such states Zimbabwe 
included find themselves in a political quagmire when it comes to how to deal with 
traditional leaders. They find it difficult to banish the structure because of its strong 
influence in rural communities whilst on the other hand it is equally difficult for the 
state to abandon its philosophy of liberal democracy where citizens are given their 
constitutional right to elect leaders of their choice. The only option left is for the state 
is to compromise and provide some space for both the elected and hereditary 
structures. It would appear that the state always leans on traditional leaders when it is 











Traditional Leaders Act seems to have compromised democracy by giving powers to 
a hereditary structure to oversee democratically elected structures. I further advance 
that when modern elected structures fail as already demonstrated in chapter two 
during the 1980s, traditional leaders seem to view their institution as the better 
alternative. Whilst one appreciates such a move, it is important to mention that for as 
long as resources are not availed to such a structure the institution of traditional 
leadership will equally fail to deliver to the poor just as good as the elected structures 
demonstrated in the early 1980s. 
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the significance of the 1990s in Zimbabwe and outlined some 
possible factors that led the Mugabe government to reconsider traditional leaders after 
almost a decade of neglect in the 1980s. The chapter has also shown how the Rukuni 
Commission came into being and how it contributed to the promulgation of the 
Traditional Leaders Act in 1998. It argued that the 1990 era was a period of 
recognising traditional leaders to oversee democratic elected structures in rural 
governance. The chapter has analysed this Act and concluded that although it 
recognises traditional authorities, such recognition still gives the state too much 
control of the communal lands. Despite their invaluable influence in rural 
communities traditional authorities playa ceremonial role in rural governance. This 
therefore explains why the state has bureaucratised such an institution in order to gain 












THE DEMOCRATISATION OF RURAL AREAS IN ZIMBABWE: 
A CASE STUDY OF ZIMNYAMA WARD 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter is about the role of traditional leaders in land administration following 
the changes that took place in Zimnyama ward during two significant periods, the 
decade of the 1980s and the era of the 1990s to present. It explores the way in which 
questions we have been trying to address in the previous three chapters played out 
during the past 26 years of independence in the given area. It opens with a description 
of the site and goes further to highlight the changes that took place in the domain of 
land administration and the role of chiefs during the period under review. To this end, 
the chapter through perceptions and opinions of interviewees reveals how these 
changes unfolded and how they affected the people in Zimnyama ward. 
In summary this chapter tells us what happened in this area from 1980 to present with 
regard to traditional leaders and land administration. Zimnyama ward falls under the 
authority of chief Wasi one of the Ndebele chiefs who were renowned for their 
unwavering allegiance to the colonial state. It is primarily for this reason that the area 
was selected in order to illustrate the dynamics in land administration and chiefs in 
post-colonial Zimbabwe in an area that was predominantly governed by loyal 
traditional leaders. The argument advanced is that not everyone in the communal 
lands was supportive of the traditional leadership structure. Finally, the case study for 











is different from what most policy pronouncements in Zimbabwe advance. 
4.2 Historical background and context Zimyama ward 
The community of Zimnyama is located in the south western part of Zimbabwe in 
Matebeleland South province in Bulilimamangwe district. The ward comprises a 
population of 9479 people translating into 4310 males and 5169 females. The ward 
has a total population of 1426 households. (Bulilimamangwe Integrated Rural 
Development Programme IRDP, Survey Report 2003). Zimnyama ward is one of the 
14 wards that collectively form Mangwe district that lies in the southern part of 
Plumtree town about 120 km from Bulawayo the second largest city in Zimbabwe. It 
is approximately 500km away from Harare the capital city of Zimbabwe. The ward 
lies in the Ramakwebana communal land which is bound to the west by 
Ramakwebana River that separates Zimbabwe from Botswana. To its east, the ward 
borders with Mpande communal land whilst on the north it borders with a commercial 
farms like Luscombe which stretches up to Plumtree town (see Map1). 
The ward is composed of 6 villages namely Mapulule, Macingwana, Sosombane, 
Sikhulu, Osabeni and Vaka all of which fall under the jurisdiction of Chief Wasi, 
Headmen Magcobafuthi and 8 village heads. Zimnyama ward derives its name from 
Zimnyama regiment of the last King of the Ndebele Kingdom Lobengula who around 
the 1890s dispatched his warriors to come to Plumtree and defend the Kingdom from 
Boer attacks largely emanating from South Africa. When the Ndebele Kingdom was 
dislodged this regiment was disbanded and the area was named Zimnyama. The 











Kalanga speaking communities around Vaka area. The ward is situated next to 
Zimnyama small scale commercial farming area which comprises 86 black elite 
owned farms created by the Smith regime as a buffer zone between white commercial 
farmers and the native reserves. Incidentally, this Native Purchase Area took the bulk 
of the communal grazing area. Because of this, the area has the largest population of 
livestock mainly cattle in the whole district. The main economic activities for the 
ward are livestock and subsistence farming of crops. In this light, land becomes a very 
important asset in the lives of the Zimnyama community. Therefore, who ever 
controls land administration ultimately controls people. As Fisiy (1995) argues that 
for most rural communities, the control and management of land is at the heart of 
control over people. His assertion suggests that whoever controls land administration 
ultimately controls people as has been demonstrated by the turn of events in chapters 
two and three. 
During colonial settlement communal people were deprived of both their grazing and 
arable land that became the bone of contention between the community and the settler 
regime. As shall be demonstrated by the interviews in the next section such 
apportionment of communal land did not go down well with the people of Zimnyama 
since it deprived them of their livelihood. 
Inadvertently, the chief and the headman could not be spared the wrath of the 
Zimnyama community since they played a meaningful role in facilitating the 
movement of people to Macingwana and other outlying villages. It is reported that 
Chief Mpukane Ndiweni was awarded a plot for his loyalty to the state in the Native 











to move from the reserves to the new area, the chief refused the offer on grounds that 
he would be detached from his people (Plumtree Native Commissioner's report 1956). 
Despite the turning down of the offer, the chief generally collaborated with the Smith 
regime especially on enforcement of rules and regulations from the state even if they 
were not in the interests of the people. 
4.3 Traditional authorities during the 1970s in the Zimnyama ward 
On the whole, the decade of the 70s in Zimbabwe saw the intensification of the war 
by the liberation forces and the increased desperation of the Smith regime hence the 
overdependence on traditional leaders for support. As noted in chapter two, it was 
during this period that chiefs were given authority over land administration in the 
communal areas. Hence all land in the reserves fell under the jurisdiction of chiefs and 
no one could dispense with land without the authority of the chief. The land 
allocation procedure was hierarchical and all requests for land were finally sanctioned 
by the chief who had the final say on land allocation matters. Because the chief was 
the land authority he had the right to decree certain cases of land allocation. Due to 
the above problems in the 1970s, traditional leaders in Zimnyama ward were 
generally viewed as oppressive elements and puppets of the Smith regime. The truth 
is not all chiefs collaborated with the colonial regime. It is the position of such leaders 
that put them in a compromising state since on one hand they were expected to 
represent the interests of the state as government bureaucrats whilst on the other hand 
the community expected them to represent their wishes as community leaders. 











Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) organised clandestine political meetings 
where traditional leaders were denounced as reactionary and traitors of the people 
because of their association with the minority government. Such political propaganda 
together with the collaborative roles of traditional authorities greatly influenced the 
community to perceive their traditional leaders with different lens 
In this regard N.A Nkomo aged 54 said, 
Before the rise of colonialism in Zimbabwe in the nineteenth century, 
traditional leaders were the custodians of people's culture and represented 
communities in all aspects of their lives .Due to the impact of colonialism, 
such influence was eroded and traditional leaders now became tools of the 
colonial master .In the 70s our chief and headman became spokesmen of the 
Smith regime who came to us with instructions from the District 
Commissioner (DC) in Plumtree on what we have to do. What worried us was 
that we were not afforded an opportunity to plan for ourselves but everything 
came down to us through the chief who told us what to do and what not to do. 
If you did not comply with the instructions of chief Wasi, you were either 
forced to pay a fine or sent to the DC where you could even suffer 
imprisonment and because of this we did not like the chief together with his 
headman and the village heads. J 
Another respondent Mr Lunga Ncube said, 
During the 70s traditional leaders assumed a more political role where 
they were used as arms of the state against the people. Chiefs forced us 
to pay poll tax, dog tax, cattle levy, dipping fees and field levies during 
this time they no longer played their traditional roles effectively but 
over concentrated on their "messenger roles" from the state. Because 
of this we were no longer happy with the chiefs as our leaders. 2 
Also in support of the above view was James Ngwenya ,a war veteran, who said, 
What I remember very vividly about traditional leaders in ward Zimnyama, is 
1 Interview with Councillor Nkomo 29 April 2006 at Mqegula Business Centre. 











that chiefs were used by the Smith regime to force us comply with some 
suppressive regulations such as contour ridge digging in our fields together 
with payment of land taxes. The chief was the final say in land allocation and 
at times you could be allocated a few acres of land for cropping even if you 
needed more. You had to justify to the chief why you wanted more land. Hence 
we tended to fear chiefs and obviously had less respect for them because of 
their association with the oppressive government. 3 
Even Chief Wasi when asked to comment on how the people of Zimnyama perceived 
traditional leaders in the 70s responded as follows: 
In the 70s we received instructions from the District Commissioner and 
pushed them onto our people for compliance those who defied us were 
punished. This did not mean that we were monsters but we were forced by 
circumstances of the day. Even if we did any thing positive to our people they 
no longer trusted us because they always believed we were siding with the 
whites due to the influence of the nationalists who dubbed us "puppets" of the 
white minority government. 4 
Despite the above views, some respondents supported the institution of traditional 
leadership and argued that the structure was responsive to their needs. Some nuances 
crop up in the Zimnyama responses. For example, Mrs R. Ndebele a 60 year old 
subsistence farmer from Mapulule village did not see anything wrong with traditional 
leaders in the 70s. She had this to say, 
The chief treated us well in the 70s by virtue of being the land authority, gave 
people land for settlement and cropping .In our area, Chief Wasi explained to 
us the importance of contour ridges hence we felt obliged to dig them in order 
to prevent soil erosion in our fields. 5 
In support of the idea Mr Sigwaza aged 70 said, 
Despite their association with the state, traditional leaders brought peace and 
3 Interview with J.Ngwenya 29 April 2006 at Mqegula Business Centre. 
4 Interview with Chief Wasi 24 April 2006 at the Chiefs homestead Macingwana vilage. 











tranquillity to our commumtles and many people visited them for help 
especially land allocation matters although clandestinely because of fear of 
victimisation by the guerrillas who did not want us to associate with such a 
structure. 6 
Mrs Maseko also an exponent of the traditional leaders said, 
We did not have any problems with our chiefs in the 70s; they treated us well 
even if there was oppression from the whites their land programmes were 
okay. They used our traditional system of governance to guide our lives .. . they 
demarcated arable from grazing area and during this period, settlement of 
people was done in an orderly manner. In our area our traditional leaders 
never betrayed us because our life continued as usual. They never restricted 
the size of our fields the only problem we experienced was lack of grazing 
areas due to the creation of the small scale farms of which they were involved 
in the implementation of this land apportionment in the late 50s. 7 
The analysis of the responses on traditional leaders and land during the 1970s reveals 
that the Zimyama community was divided into two opposing camps. There were 
those, mostly women who never saw anything wrong with chiefs whilst the other 
camp composed of relatively younger people who were in the majority accused chiefs 
of having dictatorial tendencies and implementing an uneven land allocation 
processes. On one hand we had people complaining about chiefs by virtue of their 
land authority restricting the size of land one can use, whilst on the other we had 
people glorifying such traditional authorities. However, 8 out of 14 respondents 
viewed chiefs as extensions of government bureaucracy designed to enforce rules and 
regulations from the colonial masters. It is this role that led people to fear traditional 
leaders rather than respect them. For instance the Land apportionment Act and Land 
Husbandry Act which resulted in the creation of Small scale farms seem to have been 
the bone of contention. Thus the overall view of the Zimnyama ward was that 
6 Interview with Mr Sigwaza 24 April 2006 at Ngekhaya Business centre. 











traditional leaders were not democratic since they were used by the settler regime 
against the people especially in the creation of small farms for a particular black 
middle class. The creation of such areas deprived communal people of their land 
hence people tended to associate the chiefs with the repressive laws of the Smith 
regime and the creation of reserves. 
4.4 The impact of post-colonial policies on governance during the decade 
of the 1980s 
It should be remembered from chapter three that the decade of the 1980s was a period 
where the new government embarked on a deliberate strategy to marginalise the 
powers of traditional authorities in land administration in favour of the newly elected 
structures. Consequently, a series of land polices were enacted during this era as 
detailed in chapter three. It is important to note that the Zimnyama respondents did 
not mention or remember any of the pieces of legislation passed but what was glaring 
and vivid in their minds were the changes that were brought about by the land 
administration laws and how they impacted on the community. Most respondents 
remembered how the new structures mis-handled land administration affairs and how 
traditional leaders were sidelined during the above era. 
It should also be remembered from chapter three that the Mugabe government 
following independence in 1980 was guided by Marxist ideology which did not 
recognise feudalistic structures like traditional authorities. Hence the intention of new 
government was to drastically curtail the role of traditional leaders in local 











having collaborated with colonial regime. 
Faced with the resistance from traditional leaders rural local governance in the 1980s 
became more complex and ambiguous as the traditional and elected structures 
struggled for power to allocate land. The equal rights approach towards rural 
governance had failed to deliver the goods. 
Incidentally, the Zimnyama ward respondents did not mention or remember any of the 
pieces of legislation enacted during the VIDeO era. What was glaring and vivid in 
their minds were the changes that were brought about by the land administration laws 
and how they impacted on the community. Most respondents remembered how the 
new structures mis-handled land administration affairs and how traditional leaders 
were sidelined during the above era because they were victims of the new approach. 
To illustrate the changes that took place in Zimnyama Mr F Masisa had this to say, 
When we got our independence in 1980, we also inherited our traditional 
leadership structure. Our politicians and freedom fighters who had despised 
such an institution in the late 70s some of them were now in government 
influenced the communities against traditional leaders. Traditional leaders 
were not trusted by the new government of Zimbabwe hence they were dumped 
or ignored and new leadership structures (VIDeOs and councillors) were 
formed to spearhead development and communal land administration. We now 
began to see such elected structures largely dominated by party stalwarts 
allocating land and directing rural governance whilst traditional leaders were 
. dB Ignore. 
To give a vivid account of what happened to the traditional leaders in the decade of 
the 80s in Zimnyama ward Mr Lunga Ncube asserted: 











In 1980, everything concerning the traditional leaders vanished because we 
had earlier on been politicised into believing that when we get our 
independent Zimbabwe, no one will suffer from poverty, no one will oppress 
others and even the oppressive chiefs will stay like ordinary people in society. 
So, in a bid to achieve the above, all the above some legislation that wiped the 
powers of traditional leaders had to be passed. This process unfolded with the 
establishment of democratically elected councils, VIDCOs and WADCOs in 
the local government arena and the transfer of land allocation from chiefs to 
the new structures. The above changes were critical in undermining the 
traditional leaders as an alternative authority to that of the state. 9 
According to Mr Willie Dube: 
The decade of the 80s saw the rise of the elected structures and the downward 
fall of the traditional leadership. We were summoned for meetings by party 
officials at engotsheni where we were exposed to such slogans as "down with 
traditional leaders and forward with the VIDCOs. Government also organised 
elections for councillors and members of the VIDCO and new boundaries 
were drawn resulting in the formation of wards and villages that cut across 
the previous traditional authority boundaries. For example following the 
formation of VIDCOs, we started seeing the demarcation of villages and 
wards as developmental units in the rural areas. The new legislation and 
policies did not recognise the traditional authorities and land administration 
became the responsibility of the elected structures. Because it was government 
policy we could not do anything ... we worked with the VIDCOs. Land 
allocation now became the responsibility of the new structures and the land 
allocation process now involved VIDCOs and the district council represented 
by the councillor. Traditional leaders were supposed to be elected into such 
the new structures if they were to play any meaningful role in rural 
10 governance. 
From the above respondents it is clear those traditional leaders in Zimnyama during 
the period under review were marginalised since their land allocation powers had 
been taken away. 
The new changes were greeted with mixed feelings in Zimnyama ward. Some people 
felt that the move was justified whilst others thought that the strategy was uncalled 
9 Note 8. 











for. When asked to comment on the sidelining of traditional leaders In rural 
administration, Mrs Elizabeth Moyo lamented, 
We welcomed the VIDeOs because they were the nearest point of reference 
before one could not think of a chief before the VIDeo. We were happy with 
their programmes of food distribution and drought relief .Ndiweni supported 
VIDeOs were good in food distribution and planning of programmes]] 
The other school of thought was against the elected structures. It attributed most of the 
problems of Zimnyama ward to the failure by VIDeos to appreciate the role of 
traditional authorities in land administration. In a bid to illuminate this argument, 
councillor NA Nkomo said: 
VIDeos caused confusion within the community because they allowed random 
settlement of people especially in grazing areas. Some people settled in 
grazing areas, others chopped trees randomly whilst some built their homes 
on sloppy and water logged areas because there was no control. It was during 
this era that we noticed a breakdown of traditional laws since no one was 
responsible for controlling the people any more because there was breakdown 
in land administration control. Traditional leaders continued to allocate land 
under the banner that land belonged to their ancestors whilst the VIDeOs 
advanced that they were legally mandated to do so by the new government. All 
this confused the communities as they did not know who was who in land 
administration.]2 
Headman Magcobafuthi had his story to tell about the problems of the elected 
structures during the 80s at Zimnyama ward: 
When the new Zimbabwe government came into power, we began to see newly 
established structures coming to take away our powers of land administration 
and settlement of civic matters/disputes. We also saw people being settled in 
our villages without our knowledge, fields or plots were allocated to people 
without our knowledge. The land allocation procedure where the chief had the 
final say now became a thing of the past and even meetings were organised 
by VIDeos and the councillor without our knowledge. It was during this time 
that we saw the rise of "kangaroo courts" where civic matters were tried 
II Note 1. 











under the trees without our input. You know what; all these things frustrated 
us the traditional leaders. 13 
The above responses illustrate the impact of the changes that took place in the 1980s. 
It should be remembered from chapter two that the era of the 1980s was characterised 
by the intended rise of elected structures and the fall of traditional authorities in rural 
governance. It appears the government was committed to undermine the authority of 
traditional leaders especially on land administration, but failed to sustain this move on 
the ground due to the resistance from chiefs and the failure of the new structures to 
deliver on the ground as already shown by the same chapter. Even though the 
Communal Lands Act (1982) advocated for the removal of land allocation function 
from traditional authorities, what was happening on the ground was different from the 
intentions of this act. It should be noted that it was during this period that we begin to 
see both the traditional and the elected structures allocating land. Consequently, the 
community was divided into two camps, those in favour of elected structures and 
those in favour of traditional authorities. This should be viewed against the backdrop 
of my argument that despite the failures of the VIDCOs not everyone in the 
communal lands was in favour of the traditional leaders. 
The responses seem to be corroborated in the literature. Nyambara (20006) and the 
Rukuni Commission Report (1994) both confirm that generally the VIDCO era was 
marked by a breakdown in land administration which subsequently led to confusion 
and lack of control. The Rukuni Commission observed that the VIDCOs leveraged 
their developmental role at grassroots level and took over the role of traditional 
leaders on land administration. Consequently there was an increasing conflict between 











village heads and VIDCOs on land allocation. What is worth noting is that the 
evidence from Zimnyama ward suggests that not everyone supported traditional 
authorities. 
But there is evidence that in Zimnyama ward some people approached the chief when 
they were in need of land instead of the councillor or VIDCO. Perhaps it is for this 
reason that traditional leaders continued to allocate land independent of the VIDCOs. 
Nyambara (2006) affirms that the conflict between the two structures for authority to 
allocate land had little to do with the equitable and productive use of land, but was a 
struggle for power, patronage and economic rents over land. As demonstrated in 
chapter two, it was the struggle for power between the traditional and elected 
structures that ultimately divided the Zimnyama community into two camps. 
To illustrate this point F Masisa re-iterated, 
The division of communities into two camps along traditional and modern 
axes was one of the problems we faced here. The elected structures lacked 
enforcement powers and offenders within the community escaped punishment 
because they did not obey the VIDeO or a councillor. Faced with such a 
scenario, the elected structures could not easily implement projects on the 
ground .Even if they never expressed their dissatisfaction about the changes 
the traditional leaders behind the scenes grumbled and castigated the move 
through boycotting the VIDeO meetings. They also harped on the importance 
of tradition and exposed the failures of the elected structures to their people 
especially on the issue of disregarding established land allocation procedures 
and failure by the VIDeos to preserve fauna and flora. 14 












The manner in which the VIDCOS settled people in our villages smacked of 
corruption because we saw homesteads mushrooming everywhere and no 
proper consultation was done with us the people. When a village head raised 
this anomaly ,the traditional leader was ridiculed and told that he had no 
legal right over land administration .He was told that land in independent 
Zimbabwe can be utilised by anyone freely .It is this free for all approach that 
led to confusion, land degradation and lawlessness in the villages. Because of 
this confusion we began to see traditional leaders allocating land to people 
illegally, whilst VIDCOS and councillors also continued to apportion land .All 
this confused us because we did not really know who was who between the 
elected and the traditional leaders, this persisted until we got to the 1990S15. 
The relevance of the above quotes should be understood within the context of my 
overall argument that not everyone supported traditional authorities in the communal 
lands of Zimnyama as evidenced by the division of the community into two camps. 
Those in support of the structure and those against it. Thus, it can not be generalised 
that the re-emergence of traditional authorities in post -colonial Zimbabwe was a 
result of the leadership structure's popularity or efficiency. There is more to it as shall 
be demonstrated in the next section. Additionally, the above quotes also signify that 
what is intended by law on paper might always be the case on the ground. 
4.5 Recognising traditional leaders in Zimyama ward the decade of the 
1990s. 
Debates have raged that because chiefs had been used by the colonial masters against 
the nationalists as detailed in chapter two, some authors like Bratton (1998) predicted 
that chiefs had lost claim to represent peasants and can not be rehabilitated. As 
demonstrated in chapter three, the above view was proved to have been over 
simplified. We have noted that despite continued legislation to limit the powers of 











chiefs in land administration during the 1980s, in practise traditional leaders 
continued to playa crucial role in matters related to land administration. As has been 
demonstrated by the chapter, the result was growing land anarchy resulting in serious 
land disputes within communities. It was the above situation coupled with the 
contradicting acts on land administration, which made the land tenure increasingly 
confusing and unclear. 
In reaction to the above the government established the Rukuni Commission which 
laid the foundation of recognising traditional authorities through the enactment of the 
Traditional Leaders Act (2000). It is important to now show how the change of heart 
of the Mugabe government had an effect on peoples' lives in Zimnyama ward. The 
following are the voices on why and how traditional authorities were finally taken on 
board. 
Mr Nkomo had this to say, 
On the government's change of heart, the political climate in the 90s had 
changed drastically because a strong opposition party MDC formed in 1991 
was gaining ground. We were told by ZANU-PF officials that the traditional 
leaders own people whereas the elected structures come and go through 
elections. Now we began to see a new shift mainly from the politicians as they 
supported the traditional leaders. Then came the Chiefs and Headmen Act 
where chiefs and headmen were paid a stipend by and so we began to see 
politicians and the ruling party officials now coming down to us to sensitise us 
on the importance of culture and the role of traditional leaders in rural 
administration government more than that of the councillors All these moves 
were clear signs that the traditional leaders were now getting attention from 
government. 16 
To concretise the above Mr Masisa said: 
I think that the government realised that traditional leaders can be easily 
manipulated. What really happened here is that chiefs and headmen were 











approached by politicians (ruling party officials) and lobbied for support 
against the rising opposition MDC. The traditional leaders were rewarded 
with the promulgation of the Traditional Leaders Act (TLA).17 
On the above issue Mrs Maseko narrated: 
I remember when chief Wasi addressed us at Zimnyama business centre 
following their meeting with the President in Harare. He explained to us that 
the government had realised its mistake of initially sidelining traditional 
leaders and now the elected structures will have to work under the owners of 
the people (traditional leaders). 18 
Some analysis of the above quotes reveals that the coming back of chiefs was largely 
influenced by political expediency. By virtue of the fact that traditional authorities 
commandeered a lot of influence in the rural communities, it was felt prudent by the 
state to bring them on board so that it neutralises the opposition. Thus, we begin to see 
some bureaucratisation of the traditional structure so that it serves by and largely the 
interests of the state. It appears that traditional authorities were transformed into 
agents of the ruling ZANUPF government more accountable to the state than to their 
people. This leads one to the observation that in both pre and post independent 
Zimbabwe the government has always manipulated traditional authorities because its 
powers to bankroll them. 
9 out of 14 of the respondents stated that they attribute the Zimbabwe government 
change of heart to the failures of the elected structures to effectively govern rural 
communities especially in land administration and settlement of civic matters at local 
level. It is also important to note that it was mainly the traditional authorities and their 
sympathisers who were biased against the VIDeOS to such an extent that they failed 
17 Note 8. 











to realise the importance of elected leadership structures. 
As much as one might admit the failures of the elected structures, it is paramount to 
highlight that the recognition of the traditional leaders was not because the structure is 
more efficient or better than elected leadership. My assessment of the situation is that 
the Mugabe government found the traditional authorities as the only suitable 
alternative given the unfolding of events as shown in chapter three. In addition, it is 
not true that elected structures dismally failed to govern rural communities as what 
most traditional leaders would want to project. The truth is government itself failed to 
provide adequate support to the new structures in the form of finances and adequate 
training as evidenced by the fact that VIDCO members were not fully trained and no 
regular elections were conducted to elect new incumbents. 
9 out of 14 people interviewed believed that politics played a major role in 
influencing the government to change its view on traditional leaders. An analysis of 
this group reveals that most of them are ordinary citizens who probably are not afraid 
to mention publicly that the rise of opposition in the form of Movement for 
Democratic Change (MDC) in Zimbabwe played a key part in influencing the 
change of heart. Traditional authorities would find it difficult to bite the hand that 
feeds them by admitting that the government gave in to political pressure because they 
are bankrolled by the state. 
It was quite interesting that the traditional leaders harped on the failures of the elected 
structures and were not keen to mention the blunders of government because they 











therefore conclude that the relationship between the state and traditional authorities is 
not mutual. My view is that traditional authorities need the state more than it needs 
them and this is evidenced by the circumstances that led to the birth of the Traditional 
Leaders Act (2000) as detailed in chapter three. The issue of bankrolling traditional 
authorities by the state makes them more vulnerable to bureaucratic manipulation. 
The findings from Zimyama ward reveal that the socio political factors were crucial in 
influencing the government to recognise traditional authorities after ignoring its role 
in rural administration for some time. As already shown in Chapter three the political 
factors correlate with Keulder's theory of social control that advances that state power 
is contested especially by traditional leaders in rural governance. This leads the state 
to seek to co-opt and bureaucratise the chieftaincy in order to exploit the control it 
exercises over people. 
We shall remember from this chapter that the Rukuni Commission initiated the re-
emergence of traditional leaders as it laid the foundation for the enactment of the 
Traditional Leaders Act (2000). The respondents from Zimnyama ward did not recall 
the above pieces of legislation but remember the changes that took place in the role of 
traditional leaders in land administration. The land allocation procedure changed as 
the village Assembly became a vital body in allocating land. The headmen and the 
chief now receive information on who has been settled in a particular village. The 
headmen and the chief do not individually sanction or veto any application for land 
allocation as this now falls under the responsibility of the Village and the Ward 
assemblies which are chaired by the village head and the headmen respectively. The 











the final say on land allocation as the land authority. According to the Traditional 
Leaders Act (2000) traditional authorities through their assemblies assist council in 
the land allocation process. 
The Zimnyama responses particularly those from traditional leaders and their 
sympathisers advocate a shift of land authority status from the Rural District Council 
to the traditional leaders. Eight out of 14 respondents were of the above idea. 
To illustrate this point one of the sympathisers of traditional leaders Mr F Masisa a 
member of Sosombane village development committee lamented, 
In my opinion the Traditional Leaders Act did not really give powers to the 
traditional authorities especially over land administration. I do not see any 
section of this act that protects chiefs from political manipulation and state 
control. Chiefs are not land authorities any more and the fact that they are 
bankrolled by the state compromises their autonomy. Our chiefs need 
autonomy so that they can be respected as legitimate leaders of the community 
therefore traditional leaders have to retain the land authority status so that 
they supervise the elected structure/ 9. 
There seems to be another dimension added to the puzzle of recognising traditional 
leaders. The 8 members suggested some integration of the elected structures into the 
traditional structures a situation that is more of sUbjugation than co-existence. In this 
light, its worth mentioning that the responses do not corroborate with the literature as 
advanced by Hlatshwayo who argues for the co-existence approach. However, the 
Rukuni Commission seemed to have captured this call by recommending the 
integration of elected structures into traditional systems of governance as shown by 
the establishment of Village and Ward assemblies coordinating the activities of 











elected structures save only the issue of the land authority. 
The findings of the Rukuni Commission seem to indicate that traditional authorities 
were popular and this explains why many people consulted them in times of need. 
Whilst one might generally acknowledge this point, the findings from Zimyama ward 
bring a new dimension that signifies that not everyone was happy with traditional 
authorities hence the split of the community into two camps as witnessed above. 
The contestations by traditional leaders to retain land authority status prove that 
governance space is contested. It is the dominant force that takes more space and 
control of rural communities that survives. The state control of communal land 
ownership and its administration despite the promulgation of the Traditional Leaders 
Act (2000) goes a long way to concretise the above assertion. 
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated how events in land administration and traditional 
authorities have unfolded from the 1980s to present. The case study has illustrated 
that many a times what policy says differs with what really obtains on the ground. 
The chapter also challenges the impression advanced by Rukuni Commission that 
everyone in the rural areas of Zimbabwe supports traditional authorities. Contrary to 
the above assertion, it has been demonstrated that in Zimnyama ward there are some 
people who fall under the Mamdani school of thought who believe that traditional 












Be that as it may, some indications from the same ward signal that despite the 
bureaucratisation of this institution by the state, it still commands a lot of influence 













This study sought to answer three interrelated questions. Firstly, the study aimed at 
understanding the role of traditional authorities in land administration in post-colonial 
Zimbabwe. Secondly, it sought to gain understanding of why the Mugabe government 
recognised traditional authorities after a decade of neglect. Thirdly, the study 
considered whether the recognition of hereditary traditional authorities is consistent 
with the principles of democracy based on representative government that became 
prominent from the early 1990s. The case study of Zimnyama ward was used to 
illuminate the above. 
5.2 The role of traditional authorities in post-colonial Zimbabwe 
It is evident from the discussions in chapters three and four that land administration is 
a contested area where the ultimate power to control rural communities rests. 
Despite the new laws recognising elected structures in land administration, the state 
continues to recognise customary law in the allocation of land. In my opinion this 
contradiction gives traditional authorities the urge to continue allocating land. It is this 
high value attached to land by rural communities, which enables traditional authorities 
to continue to playa crucial role in land administration. The above argument seems to 
prove the theory advanced by Fisiy (1995) that there is a corresponding relationship 
between the one who controls land and the amount of power the stakeholder 
commands over rural communities. Where such control over land has been whittled 
away, their grip over the communities has been lost. It is therefore not surprising why 











VIDCO era in order to maintain their grip Icontrol on the rural communities through 
the administration of communal land. It also explains that the importance of 
customary land administrative systems is the life blood for the survival of rural 
communities. 
In the light of the above, the study has proven that for as long as people still believe in 
customary law as demonstrated by the Zimnyama community, land administration can 
not be effectively managed without the involvement of traditional authorities. Hence 
the laws governing land administration should be harmonised. Most importantly, the 
roles and responsibilities of traditional authorities in such laws should be clearly 
defined to avoid overlaps and conflicts. 
5.3 Why did the Mugabe government recognise traditional authorities in the 
1990s? 
This thesis discussed and argued that a number of events should have influenced the 
post-colonial Zimbabwe government to recognise traditional authorities after a decade 
of neglect. The causes were categorised into internal and global forces. On the internal 
front, it was argued that the late 1990s in Zimbabwe saw the rise of meaningful 
political opposition to the ruling party (ZANU-PF). The rise of the economic 
hardships in Zimbabwe in the late 1990s and the beginning of the new millennium 
bred some favourable ground for the rise of opposition. This culminated in the birth of 
the MDC as a challenge to the ruling party's domination. In order to gain control of 












It was also demonstrated that the global, socio-economic and political change, notably 
the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet as a superpower, contributed to the 
abandonment of Marxism- Leninism. This also marked the rise of multiparty 
democracy and capitalism as the dominant economic mode of production. Such a 
strategy was accompanied by the push for decentralisation over developing countries 
by the dominant West. In the light of the above, the Mugabe government seemed to 
have been greatly influenced by the global political and economic transformations in 
the world to have a change of heart in its position towards traditional authorities. 
5.4 Can the two structures co-exist in rural governance? 
This thesis argues that the co-existence approach encourages effective rural 
governance as it provides a window for taping the positive elements of the two 
structures. Whilst one appreciates that representative democracy gives options to the 
people to elect a leader of their choice, it should also be noted that it is not the only 
game in town because traditional authorities are renowned for their participatory 
approach towards decision making. As has been demonstrated in chapter one, both 
elements representative and participatory democracy are key to responsive 
governance. In my opinion, the democratisation of rural governance lies in finding out 
how best the co-existence model can be operationalized in such a manner that it does 
not neglect the positive elements of both the two leadership structures. I therefore 
argue that traditional and elected structures should co-exist in rural governance as 
equal and mutual partners. Trivialising or denigrating one leadership structure at the 
expense of the other creates conflicts and struggles for power which ultimately 











shifted its focus from the equal rights approach to the co-existence model of 
governance after the near collapse of rural administration. In essence neither the 
equal rights nor the co-existence model worked effectively for the rural communities. 
The way forward as argued above is that the co-existence model should be 
restructured to such an extent that it cultivates a symbiotic and mutual relationship 
between the two structures. The state should be a neutral arbiter rather than a key 
force in land administration. 
In my opinion, rural development can be greatly improved if our post -colonial states 
build on the foundations of the positive features of traditional leadership rather than 
ridicule the structure as archaic and undemocratic largely due to the influence of the 
West. If rural people still believe in customary law where traditional authorities playa 
key role in land administration, then none of us has the right to challenge their choice. 
It should be noted that the fundamental tenet for democracy is giving people choices. 
5.5 Concluding remark 
We have seen how the equal rights model faired in Zimnyama during the 1980's. The 
issue of marginalising traditional authorities in favour of the newly elected structures 
resulted in a host of problems in land administration. In the 1990s we begin to see the 
insurgence of traditional authorities through the promulgation of the Traditional 
Leaders Act (2000). This Act also came with some problems particularly those that 
question the nature of democracy under co-existence. My argument is that the nature 
of co-existence should be reviewed to ensure a mutual and symbiotic relationship 











The fact that the majority of rural people opt to consult a hereditary institution instead 
of an elected structure especially on customary land administration, demonstrates that 
democracy is 'works in progress' and is perceived differently. An effective co-
existence model ought to improve rural governance rather than inhibit it. It should tap 
on the positives of both worlds and leverage resources for the rural poor. The key 
challenge for those post-colonial states which subscribe to the co-existence approach 
is to make this model more responsive to the needs of the people without 
compromising on the tenets of representative democracy and the positive elements of 
the traditional structure. Following the above I argue that Africa cannot build a bright 
future without building on the foundations of the positive elements of the traditional 
leadership. The need for a more responsive co-existence approach in rural 
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Profile of respondents or interviewees 
1. Chief Wasi, male aged 69 and Chief of the area has Standard Four qualification. 
2. Mrs Ruth Ndebele, female aged 50 and local farmer has a Standard Three 
qualification 
3. Councillor Nana Albert Nkomo, male aged 54 and local councillor has a Junior 
Certificate 
4. Mr Richard Sigwaza, male aged 60 and former Agricultural Extension Officer has a 
certificate in Agriculure and standard Six. 
5. Headman Magcobafuthi, male aged 65 and Headman of the area has a Standard 
Two qualification. 
6. Villagehead Ndiweni male aged 72 and local Village head has a Standard Two 
qualification. 
7. Mrs Veronica Maseko, female aged 68 and local farmer has a Standard one 
qualification. 
8. Mr Freddy Masisa , male aged 56 and former VIDCO chairman of the area has a 
Standard Six qualification. 
9. Mr Lunga Ncube, male aged 54 and local farmer has a Standard Two qualification. 
10. Mr James Vimba Ngwenya, male aged 52 and local farmer has a Sub B 
qualification. 
11. Mr Willie Dube, male aged 62 and former VIDCO chairman of the area has a Sub 
B qualification. 
12. Mrs Soneni Songo, female aged 43 and Ward Development Co-ordinator of the 
area has Ordinary level qualification. 
13. Ms Sifiso Dube, female aged 39 and Acting Chief executive Officer of council has 
a diploma in Local government Administration. 
14. Mr Jonathan Mlambo, male aged 42 District head Ministry of Youth and 
Employment creation has Ordinary level qualification. 
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